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The ‘Sanctuary City’ Syndrome
Reaches Arbitration: State Supreme Courts
Defy Federalization
by Thomas E. Carbonneau
“Obdurate Opposition: As children eventually
learn as they progress toward adulthood, permitting
intense anger to invade the human spirit in the face of
disagreement only brings momentary personal relief.
A fit of temper harbors feelings of guilt, but no
resolution. It mistakes monologue for dialogue and
substitutes irrationality for self-control. It quickly
becomes a self-inflicted exile and could lead the
group to which the individual belongs to disown its
member. The chaotic burst of emotions is a false
attempt to reconcile the contradistinctive human need
for asserting individuality and engaging in effective
social communion.”

A. In New Hampshire: Finn v. Ballentine
In Finn v. Ballentine,1 the parties disagreed
about the monetary consequences of the termination
of one of the company’s founders and then CEO. The
facts involved two separate arbitrations that addressed
the aftermath of the corporate ‘push out’. As a
Finn v. Ballentine Partners, 169 N.H. 128 (N.H. 2016).
(The factual account that follows in the text is distilled from
various parts of the record in the court’s opinion. It has been
substantially reorganized and rewritten).
1
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founder of the company, Finn owned nearly 40% of
the company shares. There were four shareholders in
addition to the two founding members of Ballentine
Finn & Company. Ballentine and the four
shareholders claimed that Finn’s termination was for
cause and exercised their right under the Shareholder
Agreement to purchase Finn’s shares “at the price
assigned to ‘for cause’ terminations . . . .” BFI
(Ballentine Finn & Company, Inc.) gave Finn a
promissory note for her shares in an amount that
represented a sum less than their current fair market
value. Before the first arbitral tribunal, Finn contested
the legitimacy of her firing and the amount BFI
offered for her shares. The arbitrators determined that
Finn’s removal was unlawful and increased the
amount of the purchase price of the shares by nearly
25% (from the company’s offer of $4,635,684 to
$5,721,756). The arbitrators further determined that,
for reasons of liquidity, the company could make
periodic payments over a number of months to satisfy
the damages ordered in the award.
In order (at least, in part) to pay Finn, BFI
engaged in a corporate re-organization. It established
BPLLC, transferring to it all of its assets and some of
its liabilities. BFI was the sole member of BPLLC.
Thereafter, BFI renamed itself Ballentine & Co. It
sold a 40% membership interest in BPLLC to
Perspecta Investments, LLC. Perspecta paid
$7,000,000 for its participation in BPLLC and also
made a capital contribution of $280,000 to BPLLC.
The cost of the membership reflected a very
substantial increase in the market value of the
2

company shares. Accordingly, Finn filed a motion to
compel arbitration to recover a portion of the
enhanced price of the shares. Finn claimed that
Ballentine & Co. was unjustly enriched by the sale
and that she was entitled to recover for her loss
because of a ‘claw back’ provision in the Shareholder
Agreement.
The second arbitral tribunal concluded that
Finn was entitled to relief on the basis of unjust
enrichment and breach of contract. The arbitrators,
however, dismissed the breach of contract claim
because they concluded that that claim had already
been considered and resolved by the first arbitral
tribunal. Nonetheless, the arbitrators ruled that Finn
was entitled to equitable relief because the company’s
wrongful conduct prevented her recovery under the
contract. The panel awarded Finn $600,000 in
equitable relief. The court vacated that award under
the state arbitration law on the grounds of ‘plain
mistake.’ The court concluded that res judicata
prohibited the awarding of damages, which had
already been granted by the first arbitral tribunal. The
damages were duplicative; double recovery was
unlawful. Finn challenged the court ruling on the
basis that—because the transaction implicated
interstate commerce—the FAA and its less exacting
review standard governed.
On appeal, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
rendered a doctrinally significant opinion that
addressed the issue of the federal preemption of state
arbitration law. In doing so, the court articulated a
new interpretation of the ruling in Hall Street
3

Associates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc.2
The new
interpretation was calculated to counter and prevent
the nullification of state law. The court’s advocacy for
the application of the ‘plain mistake’ vacatur ground
in the state arbitration law was well-crafted,
analytically sophisticated, and—to a degree—
persuasive. It introduced the concept of the ‘partial
avoidance’ of federal preemption and made the case
for the development of a larger regulatory role for
state law in American arbitration. It effectively
exploited the convolution of SCOTUS’ reasoning and
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). See
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Rise in Judicial Hostility to
Arbitration: Revisiting Hall Street Associates, 14 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 593 (2013); J. Keaton Grubbs, Justin R.
Blount, & Kyle C. Post, Arbitration Agreements, Expanded
Judicial Review, And Preemption—Hall Street Associates and
NAFTA Traders, Inc.—A National Debate With International
Implications, 24 SOUTH. L. J. 2 (2014); Richard C. Reuban,
Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1103 (2009); Kenneth R. Davis, The End of an Error:
Replacing “Manifest Disregard” with a New Framework for
Reviewing Arbitral Awards, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87 (2012);
Brian T. Burns, Freedom, Finality, and Federal Preemption:
Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under
State Law After Hall Street, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1813 (2010);
Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal
and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the
Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 597 (2009); Matthew J. Brown, “Final” Awards
Reconceptualized: A Proposal to Resolve the Hall Street Circuit
Split, 13 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 325 (2013); Patrick Sweeney,
Exceeding Their Powers: A Critique of Stolt-Nielsen and
Manifest Disregard, and a Proposal for Substantive Arbitral
Award Review, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1571 (2014).
2
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indecision in Hall Street. The Court could only amass
a majority through a series of trade-offs and
compromises—at the price of not achieving even a
modicum of doctrinal clarity. The features of Hall
Street allowed the state court to ignore the thrust of
the Court’s rulings in the federal preemption cases
and to contradict and challenge the supremacy of the
FAA in matters of arbitration.
The ‘plain mistake’ ground for the vacatur of
arbitral awards under New Hampshire’s arbitration
statute permits courts, albeit in limited circumstances,
to assess the merits of the arbitrator’s determinations.3
Like ‘manifest disregard of the law’,4 it is a means by
Finn, 169 N.H. at 142-145.
On ‘manifest disregard’, see Michael H. LeRoy, Are
Arbitrators Above the Law? The ‘Manifest Disregard of the Law
Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137 (2011); Stephen L. Hayford,
Reining in the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard: The
Key to Restoring Order to the Law of Vacatur, 1998 J. DISP.
RESOL. 117 (1998); Liz Kramer, Circuit Split Persists Regarding
Whether Arbitrator’s “Manifest Disregard” Of Law Can Vacate
Arbitration Award (June 25, 2015), available at: http://www.
arbitrationnation.com/circuit-split-persists-regardingwhether-arbitrators…/; Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest
Disregard, 119 YALE L. J. ONLINE 1 (2009), available at:
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-mess-of-manifest-disregard;
Jason R. Brost, Court Rejects Claim That Arbitrator’s Ruling
Was in Manifest Disregard of the Law (May 24, 2017),
available
at:
http://reinsurancefocus.com/archives/12094?utm_source=
Mondag&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=V/;
Thomas V. Burch, Manifest Disregard and the Imperfect
Procedural Justice of Arbitration, 59 KAN. L. REV. 47 (2010);
Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Reconsidering Arbitration: Evaluating
3
4
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which courts can gauge the validity of the arbitrators’
application of law to the facts of the litigation and the
‘accuracy’ of their interpretation of the governing law.
The merits review of arbitral awards poses a
significant challenge to arbitral autonomy5—a core
feature of most contemporary arbitration laws and of
the FAA, especially as reinterpreted by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Merits review could be a ‘death
blow’ to the arbitral process.
There can be little doubt that the ‘plain
mistake’ ground allows courts to look over the
shoulder of arbitrators as they apply the law to the
facts of the case. It subjects the recourse to arbitration
to a more protracted and deeper contact with the
judicial process, thereby depriving parties of the
benefit of their bargain for arbitration. It reduces the
functionality and effectiveness of arbitration and
makes it a lesser adjudicatory alternative. It
transforms the correction of legal error into a
singularly important objective of judicial supervision.
the Future of the Manifest Disregard Doctrine, 21 SOUTH. L. J.
41 (2011); William H. Hoofnagle III & Byran W. Horn,
Vacating Arbitration Awards for Manifest Disregard of the Law
(May 2013), available at: http://ascelibrary.org/doi/full/10.1061/
(ASCA) LA. 1943-4170.0000110/: Tom Ginsburg, The
Arbitrator as Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always
Pro-Arbitration, 77 CHI. L. REV. 1013 (2010); Stephen Wills
Murphy, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State
Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 887 (2010); Karen A. Lorang, Mitigating
Arbitration’s Externalities: A Call for Tailored Judicial Review,
59 UCLA L. REV. 218 (2011).
5
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 27-30, 90 (4th ed. 2017).
6

Awards are reduced to the status of being just
another adjudicatory determination—no longer the
product of a categorical and powerful legal policy that
elevates arbitration to a constitutional necessity.
More aggressive judicial supervision enhances the
risk of reversal for awards because arbitrators are
unlikely to apply the law in the customary lawyerly
way. The brief for merits review also does not take
into account the ever-present judicial disagreement
about the meaning and application of law in particular
cases. It would seem that arbitrators as adjudicators,
who additionally are not bound by stare decisis,
should be given at least the same degree of
professional freedom as judges. After all, they
perform a very similar function.
The New Hampshire High Court’s justification
for its support of the state statutory ground was drawn
not only from Hall Street, but from Volt Information
Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. Trust. Stanford Univ.6 as well—
the two cases being anomalies in the Court’s
decisional law on arbitration. In Volt, the Court stated
that “the FAA . . . does [not] . . . reflect a
congressional intent to occupy the entire field of
arbitration.”7 This assertion was uncharacteristic of
the Court’s prior and future holdings on
arbitration. The statement was used by the Volt Court
to justify an atypical and bizarre holding on the
federalization issue that undermined the objective of
establishing a uniform national law on arbitration. The
New Hampshire court took advantage of these
6
7

Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
Id. at 477.
7

doctrinal irregularities and used them to justify the
application of the state law provision on vacatur.
In Hall Street, the Court aligned its opinion
with the observation in Volt about the limited role of
federal law in the field of arbitration by constricting
the range and role of contract freedom in American
arbitration law and limiting the parties’ options for
review to the stipulated statutory grounds.8 The Hall
Street Court also made the equally unusual comment
that there are frameworks other than the FAA for
securing the judicial review of arbitral awards—in
particular, a more aggressive form of review than the
limited review available under FAA §10.
Specifically, it asserted that state laws could
provide that more rigorous review. (“We do not agree
. . . that the FAA is the exclusive method by which to
review . . . [arbitral] award[s]. . . .”9); (“If the FAA
were, in all circumstances, the exclusive grounds for
review of arbitration awards subject to the FAA, these
possible alternative paradigms of judicial review that
the Court described would have been completely
foreclosed.”10 [Emphasis added]). These declarations
in atypical arbitration cases (Hall Street and Volt)
were made by a clearly divided court. That
disagreement became the aperture through which the
New Hampshire court reintroduced state authority
into the legal framework for the regulation of
arbitration.

Hall St., 552 U.S. at 590.
Finn, 169 N.H. at 138.
10
Id. at 139.
8
9

8

Acknowledging that the FAA contains less
invasive grounds for supervising arbitral awards than
the state basis of ‘plain mistake’, the New Hampshire
court ruled that:
[W]e conclude that §§9-11 of the
FAA apply only to arbitration review
proceedings commenced in federal courts
. . . when the contract to arbitrate affects
[interstate] commerce. . . . Section 2 of
the . . . [FAA] applies in state courts to
prevent anti-arbitration laws from
invalidating otherwise lawful arbitration
agreements. . . . However, it does not
follow that the FAA applies to state
courts in its entirety. In fact, the Supreme
Court has suggested that some of the
statute’s provisions apply only in federal
courts. . . . [T]he Court noted that . . .
‘§§3 and 4 . . . by their terms appear to
apply only to proceedings in federal
court’. . . . This comment clearly
contemplates that the Court considers the
application to the states of each section
individually, rather than the application
of the Act as a whole. . . .11
[...]
[T]he Supreme Court . . . has
described the primary purpose of the
FAA as ‘foreclos[ing] state legislative
11

Finn, 169 N.H. at 138.
9

attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.’12
[...]
[T]he Court emphasized that ‘[t]he
overarching purpose of the FAA . . . is to
ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as
to facilitate streamlined proceedings.’13
The New Hampshire court may have accurately
represented the surface meaning of the SCOTUS
pronouncements in eccentric decisions, but it ignores,
perhaps deliberately, the key feature of the Court’s
doctrine that would invalidate the state court’s view of
the role of state laws in the regulation of arbitration.
It avoids considering the Court’s primary motivation
for preempting state law in arbitration. In its analysis,
the state court never refers to the “emphatic federal
policy favoring arbitration”14—the Court uses this
policy (which it itself discovered in the FAA and
proclaimed to be the linchpin concept of American
arbitration law) to fill the holes in, and answer the
difficult questions about, the federal law on arbitration
and to set the direction for the development of
American arbitration law. In point of fact, the Court’s
Finn, 169 N.H. at 140.
Id.
14
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Freedom and Governance in
U.S. Arbitration Law, 2 GLOBAL BUS. L. REV. 59, 64 (and notes)
(2011).
12
13
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recognition of the narrow scope of the provisions in
the FAA (§§3 and 4) testifies to the ad hoc,15
circumstantial, and—at times—imperfect conceptual
content of the Court’s doctrine on arbitration, but
those attributes do not alter or negate the fundamental
principles of federal arbitration law dictated by the
Court’s ‘emphatic federal policy.’
To buttress the credibility of its analysis in the
quoted statements, the state court reasons, albeit
syllogistically, that even SCOTUS (in Volt and Hall
Street) recognized the restrictive character of the
FAA’s jurisdictional and substantive scope.
The California courts are particularly fond of emphasizing
the language of FAA §§ 3 and 4 as a means of restricting the
jurisdictional reach of the federal statute. See, e.g., Engalla v.
Permanante Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997);
Cable Connection, Inc., v. DirecTV, Inc., 190 P. 3d 586 (Cal.
2008). The Court gave rise to this trend in Moses H. Cone Mem.
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)
when it stated that the FAA was “something of an anomaly. . . .
It creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and
regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate, yet it does
not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction. . . .”
The Court then referred specifically to FAA §§ 3 and 4. It
acknowledged that the enforcement of the Act was “left in large
part to the state courts. . . .” See James Zimmerman, Note,
Restrictions on Forum-Selection Clauses in Franchise
Agreements and the Federal Arbitration Act: Is State Law Preempted, 51 VAND. L. REV. 759, 764 (1998); Stephen L. Hayford,
Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A
Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 10 (1996); cited in
Paul Turner, Preemption: The United States Arbitration Act, the
Manifest Disregard of the Law Test for Vacating an Arbitration
Award, and State Courts, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 519, 520 n.2 (1999).
15
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According to the state court, the statute is applicable
only in cases governed by federal law. It does not,
however, substantiate that statement analytically or
with references to actual cases. Moreover, the court
asserts that the fundamental objective of the FAA is to
foster the enforcement of arbitration agreements by
shielding them from inhospitable state statutes
(“Section 2 of the [federal] act applies in state courts
to prevent anti-arbitration laws from invalidating
otherwise lawful arbitration agreements.”). In the state
court’s assessment, award enforcement (as opposed to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements) is not part
of the FAA’s fundamental objectives. The statement
is calculated to act as the foundation for the
remaining, even more unconventional, analysis. Be
that as it may, it is inconceivable that enforcement of
the result of an arbitration is of lesser importance to
the fulfillment of the ‘emphatic policy’ than the
institution of the proceeding through the parties’
agreement.
The New Hampshire High Court focuses upon
SCOTUS’ least hospitable rulings on arbitration and,
from their unique content, fabricates a wishful
framework for salvaging the role of state law in the
regulation of arbitration. The distinction between
arbitral agreements and awards that SCOTUS implies
in Hall Street is a means to an end—a fragment of
legal reasoning that upholds and eventually justifies a
doctrinal conclusion, i.e., extinguishing the effects of
contract freedom at the enforcement stage of the
arbitral process. For the state court, then, substantive
judicial review becomes, somehow, part of the
12

‘emphatic federal policy’ and, therefore, a fully lawful
means by which to regulate the arbitration process.
The New Hampshire court reinterprets the forced
distinction between arbitral agreements and awards
(articulated in Hall Street) to create room for its
restrictive state law on arbitration. The actual federal
arbitration law strongly disfavors merits review
because it allows courts to second-guess arbitrators.
Such a practice robs arbitration of its
operational autonomy for the sake of promoting
would-be legally correct substantive results. It is
evident that both the front and back-end of the arbitral
process are equally vital to the operation of
arbitration. In fact, without enforcement, the entire
alternative adjudicatory process would collapse and
become useless and ineffective. Pyrrhic victories may
have some symbolic value, but—by definition—they
are obtained at an excessive price. Finality and
fairness are the trademarks of useful and resorted-to
adjudication.
When the state court declares—disingenuously
citing other SCOTUS rulings16 that, in reality, are
unqualifiedly favorable to arbitration—that the
“overarching purpose”17 of the federal statute on
arbitration “is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate
streamlined proceedings,”18 it tendentiously ignores
how crucial enforcement is to any system of
adjudication. SCOTUS does not ignore the
Finn, 169 N.H. at 140-142.
Id. at 140.
18
Id.
16
17
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fundamental importance of enforcement to
arbitration—not in Volt, not in Hall Street. Despite a
few foibles, SCOTUS’ determinations are, in the
main, intended to achieve a uniform and, therefore,
workable and effective law of arbitration.19 While a
few weaker cases20 emerged from an embattled Court,
the policy favoring arbitration was never in doubt or
question. For its part, the state court arbitrarily
manipulates and dilutes the FAA in order to attribute
a controlling function to state law in matters of the
enforcement of arbitral awards.
The Court creates an unsanctioned and
previously
unknown
concept
of
‘qualified
preemption’: limited and unlimited preemption of
state law by the FAA.21 The contrivance allows the
court to declare, at least in theory, that the FAA has
only a conditional impact on the vacatur and
confirmation of awards.22 According to the state court,
The Court’s opinion in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), is particularly instructive in
this regard. There, the Court qualified the absolute contract
freedom doctrine in Volt to ensure that the exercise of contract
freedom resulted in arbitrability. See also BG Group v.
Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 (2014).
20
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968); Volt Info.
Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989); Hall St. Assocs., v.
Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
21
Finn, 169 N.H. at 142-143.
22
Id. at 143.
19
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if preemption is based upon a conflict of regulatory
objectives between state and federal statutes, state
laws cannot simply be automatically displaced or
voided; they can still regulate award enforcement as
long as the statutory conflict is not a ‘fundamental’
clash between regulatory schemes.23 Some restrictive
state laws on arbitration, in the court’s view, are no
more than venial impediments to the FAA’s control
over arbitration.24 As with the Discover Bank
Rule25—a provision that the Court invalidated in
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,26—federal law
preempts restrictive state laws that apply
disproportionately to arbitration contracts when they
function as “a thinly veiled refusal to enforce
arbitration agreements.”27
Another serious failing of state laws is their
promotion of class litigation through statutory
provisions or decisional rulings that prohibit, directly
or indirectly, waivers of the right to engage in class
proceedings.28 As SCOTUS observed in Concepcion,
these outlawed waivers can have the beneficial effect
of preventing arbitrating parties from converting a
bilateral arbitration into a class proceeding.29 State
laws should permit class action waivers to obviate the
Finn, 169 N.H. at 142.
Id.
25
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 113
P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2000).
26
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
27
Finn, 169 N.H. at 140.
28
Id. at 141.
29
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
23
24
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possibility that the party intent to engage in bilateral
arbitration is ignored.30 State laws cannot generally
prohibit arbitration contracts, expressly or impliedly,
and apply limitations disproportionately to them and
place their legitimacy in doubt. According to the state
court, outright or evident hostility to arbitration under
state law cannot be tolerated, but a measured or
moderate antagonism toward the arbitral process
represents a normal exercise of the state’s political
and regulatory authority.31 Drawing again selectively
from Volt and anchoring its statement in the strained
distinction between arbitration agreements and
awards, the court declares: “ . . . state rules that slow
or change [arbitral] procedures without the potential
consequences of invalidating an arbitration agreement
are not preempted.”32
The state court further misreads or reinterprets
the Volt opinion by describing the procedural rule of
California state law33 that blocked the recourse to
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
Finn, 169 N.H. at 142.
32
Finn, 169 N.H. at 140.
33
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2(C) (West 1982), cited in
Volt, 489 U.S. at 471 n.3. The Statute provided that a court
confronted with two on-going and conflicting proceedings, both
involving the same matter and the same parties, one being an
arbitration, could resolve the conflict in one of four ways: (1)
not enforce the arbitration agreement; (2) combine issues for
joinder; (3) compel arbitration; or (4) stay the arbitration. It was
evident that the court used a state law of procedure to
subordinate the arbitration to a judicial proceeding—a
consequence that is evidently in conflict with federal
preemption.
30
31

16

arbitration in Volt as a mere annoyance, devoid of
truly
consequential
effect.34
Although
it
acknowledged that the FAA would provide a contrary
result, the court claimed that the application of the
California procedural rule only engendered a stay of
the arbitration and not a nullification of the arbitration
agreement.35 The distinction is transparently
calculated to reach a foregone conclusion; moreover,
it distorts actual reality. It ignores the incontrovertible
fact that the postponement of the arbitration, in the
end, will inevitably lead to its abandonment—if only
for economic reasons, thereby rendering the
arbitration agreement ineffective. Such a result does
frustrate the fundamental goals of the FAA.
Again, characterizing the FAA’s chief objective
as the enforcement of arbitration agreements and the
elimination of “the judiciary’s long-standing refusal to
enforce the agreements to arbitrate,”36 the state court
adds that Congress did not see “expeditious review as
a primary goal of the FAA.”37 The hair-splitting is
deliberately meant to justify a single conclusion and is
self-evidently specious. The court then reiterates that
obstructing arbitration through state law rules is
permissible as long as it is done in moderation: “The
fact that a state law affecting arbitration is less
deferential to an arbitrator’s decision than the FAA

34
35
36
37

Finn, 169 N.H. at 141.
Id.
Finn, 169 N.H. at 141.
Id.
17

does not create an obstacle so insurmountable as to
preempt state law.”38
Much of the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s
advocacy, as noted earlier,39 is based on its reading of,
and reliance upon, the majority opinion in Volt. Volt
was an astonishing addition to the Court’s decisional
law on arbitration; while the Volt Court touted
contract freedom as a central pillar of American
arbitration law, it cast substantial doubt on the Court’s
willingness to pursue federalization and federal
preemption in the area of arbitration.40 Displaying an
unusually passive and disinterested attitude toward the
regulation of arbitration, the Volt Court appeared
willing to share power over arbitration with state
courts and legislatures as long as the contracting
parties commanded it in their agreement.41 The
hegemony of federal arbitration law, it seemed, was
not the primary objective of the federal enactment.
Finn, 169 N.H. at 141.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
40
See, e.g., Arthur S. Feldman, Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University:
Confusing Federalism with Federal Policy Under the FAA, 69
TEX. L. REV. 691 (1991). After the Federalism Trilogy, the
decision in Volt to follow the state procedural regulation and
void the reference to arbitration was unexpected. In the wake of
Volt, many commercial litigators concluded that the law had
returned to a rule of non-preemption of state law and that the
Court’s endorsement of arbitration was at an end. Justice
Thomas’ dissent in Mastrobuono was completely accurate: Volt
and Mastrobuono could not co-exist. Eventually, Volt would
fade into the background and the mandate of arbitrability would
become dominant.
41
Volt Info. Scis. V. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
38
39
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A line of SCOTUS rulings following Volt,
beginning with Mastrobuono42 and ending most
recently with DirecTV v. Imburgia,43 re-established
the vitality of federalization and federal preemption in
the American law of arbitration and significantly
moderated the Court’s absolute version of contract
freedom. Now, parties could choose the governing
law as long as it sustained the reference to
arbitration.44 Ignoring that qualification and the other
cases, the state court concluded that: “Volt
demonstrates that not all obstacles to arbitration are
repugnant to the FAA.”45
According to the state court, unlike the
California procedural rule at issue in Volt, the state
law rule banning class waivers (the Discover Bank
Rule) promoted multi-party litigation that constituted
“an extreme alteration of arbitration procedure, risks,
and efficiency.”46 The application of that rule in the
circumstances of Concepcion could have had “such a
profound effect” that parties would be discouraged
from engaging in arbitration,47 thereby frustrating the
FAA’s primary objective, i.e., the enforcement of
arbitral agreements: “[T]he FAA does not preempt all
state-law impediments to arbitration; it preempts

Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52
(1995).
43
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
44
Finn, 169 N.H. at 141.
45
Finn, 169 N.H. at 141.
46
Id.
47
Id.
42
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state-law impediments to arbitration agreements.”48
This analysis of the federal preemption doctrine was
tailored to validate the New Hampshire provision
permitting courts to review awards for ‘plain
mistake.’ The court ignores the undeniable fact that
the lack of award enforcement is the most substantial
means of impeding the recourse to arbitration
agreements.
As noted earlier,49 the state court’s reinterpretation of SCOTUS’ cases ignores the Court’s
core doctrinal motivation.50 Over the years and cases,
the Court felt impelled to produce a comprehensive
and unitary body of legal provisions for the regulation
of arbitration. As noted several times elsewhere,51 the
Court was not interested in arbitration for its
intellectual and analytical worth. For the Court,
arbitration was an instrument of policy—a means of
creating a process that provided effective civil
litigation.52 The Court used its authority to create a
shield by which to protect arbitration from adversarial
litigation; subjecting arbitration cases to the standard
litigation practices would have destroyed its systemic
value entirely.53 The unbending clarity of its
arbitration doctrine created a discipline that allows the
process to function undisturbed. The Court was
Finn, 169 N.H. at 141.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
50
Id.
51
See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 55-56 (4th ed. 2017).
52
Id. at 55.
53
Id. at 61-62.
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rightly convinced that the finesse of legal exceptions
and distinctions could only hinder the development of
arbitration.54
The New Hampshire Supreme Court wove its
distinctions out of whole cloth. The twists and turns of
the analysis did not mask the conclusory character of
its reasoning. At least in terms of arbitration, it reignited the great federalism debate about the standing
of states’ rights in the federal system. The state court
attempted to challenge federal hegemony on
arbitration. Arbitration, however, had become
indispensable to the constitutional integrity of
American citizenship. In the American law of
arbitration, there was only one concept of federal
preemption, and its purpose was always to express,
then to achieve, the ends of the ‘emphatic federal
policy favoring arbitration.’ There were no partial
(and, therefore, no admissible) trespasses on federal
authority. A trespass was always a trespass. Effective
laws were clear and unambiguous. They generally had
an unambiguous focus on a single objective.
The FAA, as written in 1925 or as rewritten by
the Court since, has never had, and does not now
have, contradistinctive regimes for regulating
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. As
mentioned earlier,55 adjudicatory outcomes are
meaningless when unenforceable. Through its
decisional rulings, SCOTUS elaborated a functional
regulation of arbitration that emphasized equally the
54

See, e.g., THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN
(4th ed. 2017).
See supra text accompanying note 11-13.

A NUTSHELL 71
55

21

front and back-ends of the process—its two critically
important stages. Whether astute or aberrant, the
policy was equally unforgiving of all acts of noncompliance and all attempts to deviate. There is no
state right to regulate arbitration differently from the
federal framework. If it applies, state law must
conform to core federal requirements. Arbitration is a
federal matter. The federal authority in arbitration is
solid, firm, and unwavering.
The New Hampshire High Court took pains to
find a means of defending the state right to regulate
arbitration. It did so by distorting the content and
purpose of the SCOTUS decisions on arbitration. It
engaged in a strained analysis that did not account for
the essential thrust of the SCOTUS rulings. It
constructed an ‘edifice’ that housed only its
misguided and unlawful resistance to federalization.
Its analysis attempted to displace a fait accompli. The
‘plain mistake’ rule cautions arbitrators not to make
mistakes in applying the law. They must emulate
judges in their application of the law. Even though the
parties bargained for arbitration, a court could rescind
arbitrator rulings if it determined that they were
wrong on the law and contained unacceptable legal
errors. The primary impetus for the opinion in Finn v.
Ballentine was SCOTUS’ unusual opinion and
reasoning in Hall Street, along with its equally
befuddling counterpart in Volt.
In many respects, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court’s analysis in Finn v. Ballentine simply
complied with the Hall Street Court’s directive that
lower courts should assess the standing of manifest
22

disregard or like bases for the judicial supervision of
arbitral awards.56 ‘Plain mistake’ could represent such
a reassessment. The state court attempted to
characterize review for ‘plain mistake’ as an
exceptional action meant to maintain the integrity of
arbitral awards. The ground is clearly intended to
allow courts to examine and evaluate an arbitrator’s
application of law: “Rather, although judicial review
is deferential, it is the court’s task to determine
whether the arbitrators were plainly mistaken in their
application of law to the specific facts and
circumstances of the dispute they were called upon to
decide.”57
The statutory ground in the state law allowed
courts to require that arbitrators reach a would-be
legally correct result or, at least, a result that was not
plagued by an allegedly manifest or evident legal
error. This circumstance, however, was not what the
parties intended when they bargained for arbitration.
Moreover, inviting judges to assess the arbitrators’
law application was a risky activity that could easily
lead to untoward results and supervisory chaos. The
court’s focus on federal preemption and state law was
so intense that it failed to see the forest through the
proverbial trees. What was left of arbitration’s appeal
to parties after the ‘plain mistake’ restriction was
applied? It demonstrated the wisdom of the SCOTUS’
intolerance of exceptions to its determinations on
arbitration. A judicially supervised arbitral process,
subordinated to the ‘rule of law,’ was unlikely to be
56
57

Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
Finn, 169 N.H. at 146.
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an effective alternative to court litigation. Echoing
and paraphrasing the historical distinction between the
submission and arbitral clause,58 the lack of arbitral
autonomy would dissuade business interests from
engaging in arbitration.
B. In Texas: NAFTA Trader v. Quinn
In its opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court referred to a Texas case that provided support
for the views and analysis expressed in Finn v.
Ballentine. Both state courts adopted similar positions
on federal preemption of state law. In NAFTA
In the 19th century and through the early part of the 20th
century, national legislation in a number of countries, e.g.,
France and Brazil, made the submission (the arbitration
agreement for existing disputes) the lawful contract for agreeing
to arbitration. Courts believed that submitting future disputes to
arbitration (through the arbitral clause) was a dangerous
proposition because neither party knew what kind of disputes (if
any) would arise. This was the position argued by the
concurring opinion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438-39
(1953). It was ostensibly a paternalistic approach to the
protection of legal rights. In reality, it was a fig leaf by which to
conceal a persistent and uncompromising judicial hostility to
arbitration. The modern law of arbitration reversed the status of
the two agreements for arbitration. These laws privilege the
independence and autonomy of arbitration to maintain its
effectiveness as an adjudicatory mechanism. If the submission
were the exclusive pathway to arbitration, few parties already in
opposition would have sufficient motivation to agree to forgo
court proceedings. The point in the text is in a similar vein: if
arbitration were not final and binding, it would have little, if
any, appeal to disputing parties.
58
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Traders, Inc. v. Quinn,59 the Texas Supreme Court
rendered a decision that gauged the impact of Hall
Street upon the federal preemption doctrine, the Texas
Arbitration Act (TAA), and the function of contract
freedom in Texas arbitration law. In Hall Street,
SCOTUS held that the parties’ authority to define
their recourse to arbitration ended with the rendition
of the award.60 Texas law, however, permitted
contracting parties to enter into special ‘opt-in’
agreements as part of their bargain for arbitration
under which the parties agreed that courts could
vacate awards if the arbitrator committed ‘reversible
error’ in deciding the case. The parties’ agreement
thereby reached into the award enforcement phase of
the arbitral process—an area that Hall Street
determined only courts could enter.
Otherwise stated, the parties could agree to
expanded judicial supervision in which the courts
were authorized (or required by party command) to
review the arbitrator’s dispositions on the merits.
Because the Texas statute did not provide for vacatur
on the basis of reversible error, it could only be
instituted through party agreement.61 In effect,
according to the Texas court, the contracting parties
could agree to place the same limitation (review on
the merits) on the arbitrator’s decisional power that
applied to a judge’s ruling and thereby protect
themselves from the risk of erroneous legal

Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W. 3d 84 (Tex. 2011).
Hall St., 552 U.S. at 586.
61
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 93.
59
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conclusions.62 Such provisions had been outlawed in
Hall Street.63
‘Reversible error’ usually involved matters
relating to the application of the governing law; it,
however—albeit more infrequently, could refer to
errors of fact as well. Generally, it was contrasted to
‘harmless’ error. If it is discovered, reversible error
would have a significant impact on the result of
litigation. Like the choice-of-law or venue, its
application could be outcome-determinative. The
error committed by the adjudicator needed to be
indisputable, profound, and grave, i.e., so substantial
that the final determination was, as a result, unjust and
should be rendered unenforceable. The error, in effect,
extinguished the validity and enforceability of the
result.64
Clear and unmistakable bias by the decisionmaker or reliance on falsified (or otherwise corrupted)
evidence were examples of possible reversible errors
in judicial litigation. There needed to be unmistakable
indicia that the adjudication could not satisfy minimal
juridical standards. In the setting of arbitration,
reversible error could mean that the arbitrator clearly
and profoundly misunderstood crucial factual
elements or the content or parts of the governing law
such that the determinations in the award were both
incongruous and—in fact—incapable of being

Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 93.
Id.
64
Id.
62
63
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comprehended by reasonable people given the issues,
interests, and facts.65
According to the Texas High Court, the Texas
Arbitration Act included the possibility of regulating
awards for reversible error by invoking the ground of
excess of arbitral authority. Therefore, a finding that
the arbitrators ruled either on a matter beyond their
mandate or made a significant legal or factual error in
their ruling would justify vacatur.66 The Texas
Supreme Court further concluded that arbitrator
reversible error or excess of authority overwhelmed
the policy favoring arbitration because, when the
parties so provided, reversible error contradicted a
specific provision in the parties’ contract (that the
determinations in the award be free of reversible
error), deprived the parties of the benefit of their
bargain, and prevented them from realizing their
reasonable expectations under the agreement.67
In effect, the Texas court allied itself to Justice
Stevens’ dissent in Hall Street68 when it declared that
contract freedom—the legal right of contracting
parties to formulate their own protocol for (entry into,
participation in, and exit from) arbitration—was at the
heart of its opposition to Hall Street’s restriction of
party prerogatives and to the imposition of that
holding on states and state courts through the federal
preemption doctrine:

Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 93.
Id.
67
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 93.
68
Id.
65
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27

As a fundamental matter, Texas
law recognizes and protects a broad
freedom of contract. We have repeatedly
said that/ ‘if there is one thing which
more than another public policy requires
it is that men of full age and competent
understanding shall have the utmost
liberty of contracting, and that their
contracts when entered into freely and
voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall
be enforced by Courts of Justice’. /We
find nothing in the TAA [Texas
Arbitration Act] at odds with this
policy.69
***
If we were to identify an essential
virtue of arbitration, it would be that it is
a creature of [party] agreement.70
The court segregated its loyalty to doctrine on a
governing law basis. When the court applied the FAA
(because of party choice-of-law or the transaction
involved interstate commerce), Hall Street was
binding precedent and controlling. In this setting,
‘opt-in’ agreements could not be enforced and the
court was relegated to the application of the content of
FAA §10 and the so-called common law grounds.71
When the TAA governs the litigation, the court
arrogated to itself the discretion to “reach [its] own
Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 95-96.
71
Id. at 94.
69
70
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judgment”72 about the meaning and applicability of
the Hall Street ruling and its consequences for the
rules of arbitration law articulated in the Texas statute
and its underlying case law.73
The state court’s analysis was in clear and
complete opposition to SCOTUS’ doctrine on federal
preemption as established by the case law decided
after Volt—in effect, as stated earlier, a line of cases
intended to rectify the impact of Volt on the
elaboration of a uniform national law of arbitration.74
The state court’s reasoning and conclusion clearly
allowed a state law (through party agreement) to limit
the autonomous operation of the arbitral process. The
FAA established the cardinal principles of American
arbitration law that had to be applied consistently
throughout the legal system. The prohibition against
the merits review of awards and the decisional
sovereignty of the arbitrator were instrumental
provisions in those principles. Since Volt, SCOTUS
had shown steadfast intolerance for limiting
arbitration through the imposition of state law
constraints.75
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
74
See supra text accompanying note 40. The relevant case
law consists of: Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,
514 U.S. 52 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995); Doctor’s Associates, Inc., v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc.,
v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S.
346 (2008); DirecTV v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463 (2015).
75
See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440 (2006).
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Review for reversible error integrated the
substantive judicial review of awards into the
regulation of arbitration. Because courts were familiar
with this standard, they were more likely to apply it
than manifest disregard and to use it to do a thorough
review of the arbitrator’s conclusions on the law.76 It
thereby would pose a greater challenge to arbitrability
and the autonomy of the arbitrator in deciding the
dispute. It represented a gross judicial trespass on the
independence, autonomy, and functionality of
arbitration. Moreover, it conflicted with the letter and
spirit of the SCOTUS case law on arbitration. Once
reversible error was incorporated into the judicial
supervision of arbitral awards, what remained of the
deferential discipline that simple error and even gross
error in the application of law or the understanding of
the facts by the arbitrator would not justify vacatur? If
there was one approach in state law and another in
federal law—and they are dichotomous—the federal
law had to prevail under the preemption
doctrine.77The Texas court, however, articulated a
very different solution to the conflict. According to
the court, when the parties agreed to limit the
arbitrator’s decisional discretion, limited judicial
“Clear error refers to a trial court’s judgment or action that
appears unquestionably erroneous to the reviewing appellate
court.” Available at: http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/clearerror/.
See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); Teva
Pharma. USA, Inc., v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. ___ (2015) (No.
13-854),
available
at:
http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/
574/13-854/.
77
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 91.
76
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supervision under FAA §10 was superseded by that
party provision. When review for reversible error was
added to the mix by party agreement, the applicable
law was irretrievably altered. In the court’s words,
legal or factual errors by the arbitrator “directly
contradict[ed] the parties’ express agreement.”78
Judicial failure to follow party prescriptions would
then “deprive [the parties] of the benefit of their
reasonable expectations.”79 The party expectation “to
limit an arbitrator’s power to err”80 gave the arbitrator
“no more power than a judge”81 and thereby allowed
contracting parties to manage their risk of exposure to
arbitrator mistakes on the law or facts.
The comparison of arbitrators and judges was a
backhanded way of saying that judges and their
rulings were, as a general rule, subject to appeal. If
judges suffered this restriction of their power and
decisional discretion, arbitrators (presumably inferior
to the public servants) should be willing to tolerate a
similar limitation. Moreover, constraining arbitrator
discretion to decide loses any discriminatory character
when it was demanded by the parties in their
agreement. Contract freedom and party provision
legitimized the containment and the legal limitation of
arbitration. The core problem, implausibly ignored
and dismissed by the Texas court, was that its
reasoning and result were in flagrant breach of the
well-settled federal law on arbitration. The statute
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 90.
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
78
79
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thereby fulfilled the parties’ desire to obtain legally
correct results by recognizing reversible error as a
basis for vacating awards and expressed it as an
excess of arbitrator authority.82
Under Texas law, contract freedom was the
first principle of the legal regulation of arbitration.
Freedom of contract transformed the party agreement
into the supreme law of arbitration. Both the law and
the courts were on the sidelines and only entered the
fray to enforce party intent or, when the latter was
absent, they provided a default regulatory framework:
[W]e agree that delay and resulting
expenses are concerns that arbitration is
intended, at least, to alleviate. But
equally grievous is a post-arbitration
process that refuses to correct errors as
the parties intended, and of equal concern
In reaching this conclusion, the Court ignored the
distinctive contributions of each process to the adjudication of
disputes. Legally-correct determinations were the special
province of the courts. Unless the parties customized the
process to their individual liking, arbitration provided a different
adjudicatory service and product.
It also refused to
acknowledge that, no matter how significant to the public
interest and the public good it may be, litigation was also a
service-providing industry. Its ‘customers’ have a wide range of
problems and needs. Arbitral adjudication was not and should
not be a blurred mirror image of judicial litigation. Citizens
with full legal capacity have the right to make choices about
their own lives through contract. Finally, as for many opponents
of ‘federalized arbitration’, the court’s analysis at bottom
represented a power struggle about which institution had the
authority to decide.
82

32

is a civil justice system that allows
parties an alternative to litigation only if
they are willing to risk an unreviewable
decision.83
Further, the Texas court argued that an
irreconcilable conflict existed between state and
federal law in the context of arbitration and federal
preemption “when state law . . . refuse[d] to enforce
an arbitration agreement that the FAA would
enforce[,]”84 unless (at least, under Texas law) the
parties have agreed to a form of merits review of their
arbitral awards. The court relied heavily upon the
opinion in Volt to find ‘safe harbor’ for its ideas that
deviated from the doctrine established by the
‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration.’ It
sought to establish and buttress states’ rights, nonnational-uniformity proposition that state laws of
arbitration could lawfully establish a more restrictive
regulation of arbitration than the federal law. Echoing
its New Hampshire counterpart, the Texas court stated
that: “The lesson of Volt is that the FAA does not
preempt all state-law impediments to arbitration; it
preempts state-law impediments to arbitration
agreements.”85 By dividing the FAA into two separate
parts (like the New Hampshire court), the Texas court
found the safe haven it sought for the application of a
less hospitable state law of arbitration. In its view, the
selective preemption that arose from an exclusive
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 91.
Id. at 93.
85
Id. at 95.
83
84
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focus upon arbitration agreements gave state laws of
arbitration a much wider regulatory scope.86 That
conclusion was both true and illegal.
The Texas court gave the opinion in Volt an
untoward significance in the elaboration of American
arbitration law, presenting it as critically significant to
the preservation of state authority in the regulation of
arbitration. While courts and commentators generally
perceived the case as wrongly decided,87 the Texas
High Court saw Volt (again, like its counterpart in
New Hampshire) as the source of a limited
preemption doctrine that tolerated well the
coexistence of state and federal laws on arbitration.88
Accordingly, partial state law limits on arbitrability
were permissible. As the New Hampshire court would
state in Finn v. Ballentine, the California procedural
provision in Volt was not preempted because it merely
‘stayed’ (rather than dismissed) the agreed-upon
arbitration proceeding. Moreover, the parties had
selected California law as the governing law.89 “The
parties’ agreement was enforced, not thwarted, by
application of the California law they had chosen.”90
After all, an unusually inhospitable and
unsupportive U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed in Volt
that the FAA was not the only framework for

Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 98.
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 52-55, 141, 163-65, 195, 386 (4th ed. 2017).
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regulating arbitration.91 It coexisted with several
different legal regimes that provided a variety of
requirements and outcomes—a theme at the heart of
the later decision in Hall Street.92 The parties in their
contract could select the governing regime and
customize their recourse to arbitration. They could
also agree to a governing law for the transaction and
the arbitration. The courts’ task was to enforce the
parties’ contract as written.93 There was no policy
imperative associated to arbitration but contract
freedom and the principle of pacta sunt servanda:
“The Supreme Court concluded that the FAA’s
purposes and objectives are not defeated by
conducting arbitration under state-law procedures
different from those provided by the federal statute.”94
The state court then emphasized a feature of the
FAA that restricted its range of application. FAA §§3
and 4 were specifically directed to federal courts
alone, leading to the undeniable conclusion that “§§3
and 4 of the FAA apply only in federal court.”95 The
New Hampshire court reached the same conclusion.96
The Texas court added that “Section 10 of the FAA,
the basis of the decision in Hall Street, is itself
See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 473
(1989).
92
See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 589
(2008).
93
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION IN A
NUTSHELL 161 (4th ed. 2017).
94
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 99.
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Id. at 99-100 n.71.
96
Finn v. Ballentine Partners, 169 N.H. 128, 138 (N.H.
2016).
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addressed only to ‘the United States court in and for
the district wherein the award was made.’”97 Further,
the U.S. Supreme Court had itself acknowledged the
anomalous circumstance that, although the FAA
established a federal right to arbitrate, it did not create
federal question jurisdiction.98 These various textual
features of the statute made its extension to state
courts and legislatures a lesser imperative. Still
ignoring the presence and overwhelming force of the
‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration,’ the
Texas High Court reached, what is at this point, the
foregone conclusion that:
The lesson of Volt is that the FAA
does not preempt all state-law
impediments to arbitration; it preempts
state-law impediments to arbitration
agreements. . . . The only reasonable
reading of . . . Hall Street . . . is that the
FAA does not preempt state law that
allows parties to agree to a greater review
of arbitration awards. . . . The TAA . . .
permits parties to agree to expanded
review, or to a corresponding limit on the
arbitrator’s authority, as in this case, but
it does not impose such review on every
arbitration agreement. . . . The matter is
left to the agreement of the parties. But
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 99-100.
See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25. See supra text accompanying note 1113.
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absent clear agreement, the default under
the TAA, and the only course permitted
by the FAA, is restricted judicial
review.99
This ‘lesson’ is only possible if the Federalism
Trilogy100 and the extensive case law decided in the
aftermath of Volt are ignored.101 The Texas court
engaged in a deliberately selective perusal of the
relevant decisional law to prove its point that limited
state law intrusions upon the regulation of arbitration
were tolerable under federal law. The strategy was
virtually identical to the approach of the New
Hampshire Supreme Court.102 The analysis was a case
study in calculated legal advocacy; it followed the
letter of the SCOTUS doctrine on arbitration only to
corrupt its soul. In many respects, the reasoning
represented a return to Wilko v. Swan103 (a difficult
choice between would-be competing policies),
Gardner-Denver104 (some statutory rights are exempt
from arbitrability), and Commonwealth Coatings105
(some legal regulations must apply to the arbitral
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 100-101.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213
(1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses
H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
101
See also note 74 supra; THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
ARBITRATION IN A NUTSHELL 76 (4th ed. 2017).
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393 U.S. 145 (1968).
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process to safeguard its use and integrity), and it
echoed the 9th Circuit’s persistent opposition to the
federal law of arbitration106 because it depreciated the
professional work of the courts and the social mission
of the law.
The Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court
filed a concurring opinion107 in which he took a
critical view of arbitration from another, less
analytically-oriented, and more policy-driven
perspective. The assessment makes the case for the
importance of the law in all societies and argues that
the privatization of legal litigation through arbitration
may be a costly, unsuitable solution to the systemic
problems it seeks to correct.108 Both sides of the
Texas court see arbitration as an inadequate and
approximative remedy to the problems of civil
adjudication, while the U.S. Supreme Court assesses it
as the exclusive and indispensable means of
correcting the dysfunctionality of civil litigation in the
American legal system and in the process of transborder litigation.109
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 279 F.3d
889 (9th Cir. 2002).
107
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 102-04.
108
See id. at 102-03.
109
The civil or public servant’s answer to problems is nearly
always adequate funding. It is an overly facile approach that
recommends a solution that is as bad as the problem it addresses.
As the ‘war on poverty’ demonstrated, throwing money at a
problem achieves virtually nothing. To the extent it generates
gratitude, it may garner votes. It seems to enrich primarily the
administrators. The Chief Justice, however, is more persuasive
in his advocacy for changes in trial procedures. Nonetheless, for
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According to the concurring opinion in NAFTA
Traders:
Increasingly, our civil disputes are
submitted to the private sector rather than
a judge or jury. The trend is neither
intrinsically good nor bad, but there are
consequences. When a case is tried in
open court, rules of evidence . . . dictate
what facts a jury may properly consider.
The proceeding is recorded, and
dispositive rulings are subject to
principles of error preservation. . . . An
arbitration is different. . . . I write only to
observe that our system is failing if
parties are compelled to arbitrate because
they believe our courts do not adequately
serve their needs. If litigation is leaving
because lawsuits are too expensive, the
bench and the bar must rethink the
crippling burdens oppressive discovery
imposes. If courts have yet to embrace
modern case-management practices, the
legislature should ensure that the justice
system has resources to improve
technology and to hire qualified
personnel—two sure ways to improve
efficiency. . . . [W]e must, in the future,
address those aspects of our justice
system that compel litigants to
reasons of lawyer training and established practices, the
SCOTUS recourse to arbitrability is more convincing.
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circumvent the courts and opt for private
adjudication.110
In a more recent case (Hoskins v. Hoskins),111
the Texas Supreme Court held that the enumerated
grounds for vacatur in the TAA are exclusive at least
from the perspective of the statutory text itself. If the
parties do not provide for a particular type of review,
the statutory grounds and limited review apply.112
With a contractual ‘assist’ from the parties, the
explicit statutory standard controls. Therefore,
common law grounds, like manifest disregard of the
law, are not available for vacating awards under state
law.113 The parties in Hoskins had agreed that the
governing arbitration law would be the TAA. The
court cited one of its prior cases to establish that
“‘[b]ecause Texas Law favors arbitration, judicial
review of an arbitration award is extraordinarily
narrow.’”114 Later, the court concluded that “the TAA
leaves no room for courts to expand on . . . [the
enumerated] grounds”115 and these enumerated
statutory grounds “do not include an arbitrator’s
manifest disregard of the law.”116 The court compared
the circumstances of this case with its precedent in
NAFTA Traders and found the circumstances to
Nafta, 339 S.W. 3d at 102-04.
Hoskins v. Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d 490 (Tex. 2016).
112
Id. at 495.
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warrant a separate and distinct legal analysis and
conclusion:
The arbitration agreement in [Hoskins]
contained no restriction (either directly or
indirectly) on the arbitrator’s authority to
issue a decision unsupported by the law.
Unlike the reversible-error challenge to
the award in NAFTA Traders, Leonard’s
manifest-disregard complaints cannot be
characterized as assertions that the
arbitrator exceeded his powers.117
[. . .]
Thus, our holding in NAFTA Traders
does not support Leonard’s broad
contention that parties may obtain
vacatur of an arbitration award on a
common-law ground that is not
enumerated in the TAA. To the contrary,
we recognize in NAFTA Traders that
“the default under the TAA . . . is
restricted judicial review. . . .”118
[. . .]
[U]nless a statutory vacatur ground
is offered, the Court shall confirm the
award. . . . [W]e may not rewrite or
117
118

Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 494.
Id. at 495.
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supplement a statute to overcome its
perceived deficiencies. The parties
signed an agreement to arbitrate under
the TAA, and that agreement contained
no limitations on the arbitrator’s
authority beyond those enumerated in the
statute. . . .119 [Emphasis in the original].
The concurring opinion provided the following
assessment of the significance of the Hoskins ruling:
Our holding that the TAA’s
vacatur grounds are exclusive establishes
that manifest disregard and, for all
practical purposes, all other common-law
vacatur doctrines are no longer viable
with regard to arbitrations governed by
the TAA./ [W]e avoid the sort of
quagmire that surrounds . . . the . . .
FAA./ [Because of the restrictive review
under the enumerated grounds]. [N]o
glosses on . . . [the] statutory bases, no
smuggling common-law in through the
back
door—and
no
judicial
intermeddling with the Legislature’s
carefully circumscribed bases for judicial
review of an arbitration award. Exclusive
means exclusive.120

119
120

Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 495-496.
Hoskins, 497 S.W. 3d at 498, 500.
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C. In California
(i) Cable Connection v. DirecTV
Like the New Hampshire Supreme Court, the
Texas High Court in NAFTA Traders drew inspiration
for its analysis and doctrine from California
decisional law—a jurisdiction open to an extensive
utilization of ADR yet leading the judicial opposition
to SCOTUS’ ‘progressive’ rulings on arbitration.121
California law, therefore, displays opposing
tendencies in its embrace of the legal policy on
alternatives to judicial litigation: open to novel
approaches to dispute resolution, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, an ardent advocate for the
importance of the traditional work of the judiciary and
its mission to maintain the social order.122 Both state
and federal courts in California have helped to create,
guide, and nurture the resistance to the SCOTUS’

See, e.g. Jones v. Citigroup, Inc., 38 Cal. Rptr. 3d 461 (Ct.
App. 2006); Szetelav. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct.
App. 2002); Badie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct.
App. 1998); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d
76 (Cal. 2005); Southland v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584
(Cal. 1982). For characteristic Ninth Circuit decisions, see
Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Associates, 553 F.3d 1277
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 145 (2009); Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002); Craft v.
Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999); Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
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See, e.g., Armendariz v. Fdn. Health Psychare Servs.,
Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745 (Cal. 2000).
121

43

elaboration of a vital role for arbitration in civil
litigation.123
The California High Court has been steadfast in
its opposition to the hegemony of the FAA, the
application of the federal preemption doctrine to
matters of arbitration, and the permissive character of
the federal judicial policy on statutory arbitrability. It
believes that state law—in particular, legislation to
repair the inequities in society and the contract
defenses to the enforcement of adhesive
contracts124—should govern the issues that arise from
arbitration agreements and the arbitral process in
cases within the territorial boundaries of the state.125
The advocacy for state law is especially unyielding
when there is no firm basis or categorical reason to
justify the jurisdiction of federal law. At the very
least, state law should not be completely eclipsed in
litigation involving contract relationships between
citizens of the state or that implicate state interests or
commercial enterprises. By the fact of its election, the
state government possesses the sovereign authority to
make law within and for the state—a right of selfdetermination (or freedom) that can be mitigated by
federal law (the Bill of Rights and the Supremacy
Clause) only in the face of the manifest violations of

See note 121 supra.
See, e.g., Smith v. Pacificare Behavior Health of Cal.,
Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 190 (Ct. App. 2001); Broughton v. Cigna
Healthplans of Cal., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334 (Cal. 1999).
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the Constitution.126 For preemption to take place, a
state law must clash with the federal government’s
core
constitutionally-established
law-making
authority. To warrant dislodging or invalidating state
law, the conflict must be both heretical and brazen; it
must attack the very principle of national political
cohesion.
In Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc.,127
for example, the California Supreme Court set the
opposition to Hall Street into motion. It described the
case’s range of application as limited to cases
involving federal law.128 It emphasized the Court’s
own statement of the holding’s restrictions; in
particular, the case did not ban the use of non-FAA
frameworks for the judicial supervision of awards that
permitted parties to agree to the enhanced review of
arbitral awards.129 When the court refused to follow
Hall Street in the interpretation of the state arbitration
statute, it stated:
The judicial system reaps little benefit
from forcing parties to choose between
the risk of an erroneous arbitration award
and the burden of litigating their dispute
The position restates the original Erie doctrine and
ignores the impact of the subsequent political and economic
development of the country, as well as the evolution of the
doctrine itself. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION
LAW IN A NUTSHELL 47, 76, 184 (4th ed. 2017).
127
Cable Connection, Inc., v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586
(Cal 2008).
128
Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 593.
129
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entirely in court . . . . There are also
significant benefits to the development of
the common law where arbitration
awards are made subject to merits review
by the parties’ agreement . . . . These
advantages, obtained with the consent of
the parties, are substantial.130
(ii) McGill v. Citibank
The California Supreme Court’s discussion of
this and related legal issues in McGill v. Citibank,131
was characteristically thorough. The analysis was
methodical and well-organized. The court, however,
demonstrated a sense of distinction so subtle that,
once made, some of its distinctions became barely
visible or comprehensible. They disappeared into the
ether or overwhelmed the intellect. Moreover, at
several points in the opinion, the court’s ideological
and political agenda peered through the cloud cover of
doctrinal considerations. Throughout the discussion of
the law, either impliedly or expressly, the High Court
distinguished between the public and private domain
and, concomitantly, between the rules that arose from
regulatory law and those that emerged from private
contracts.132 The discussion strongly suggested that
governmental interests and activities were the
paramount concerns of the legal system and that they
could dislodge, even overrule, privately-formulated
Cable Connection, 190 P.3d at 601.
McGill v. Citibank, 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017).
132
McGill, 393 P.3d at 89.
130
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rules.133 In the court’s view, enacted legislation was a
manifestation of the sovereign political will of the
state government and could not be diminished or
altered by the exercise of private contractual
authority. Establishing the rule of law and defining
public policy were within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the elected and appointed government.134
The state court saw its primary task in McGill
as establishing a legal basis for the application of state
law and preventing the encroachment of federal law
and jurisdiction. Within the territory of the state, its
citizens had a right to be governed by state law, and
state law should be the source of governing legal rules
and controlling political values.135 The idea of
contract freedom and the obligation of enforcing
arbitration contracts could be, and was, replaced by an
allegiance to locally legislated law and the local
mores of judicial adjudication. The constitutional
supremacy of federal law could and needed to yield,
at times and on some issues, to state territorial
sovereignty, especially in litigation involving the
application of state law to the interests of state
residents.
To a not insignificant degree, the McGill
opinion and related determinations reignited the
discussion of states’ rights that attended the
formulation of the Articles of Confederation and later

McGill, 393 P.3d at 93-94.
Id. at 92.
135
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the U.S. Constitution.136 The states’ rights issue is
akin to the ideological turmoil that today accompanies
the debate about sanctuary cities, illegal immigration,
the commander-in-chief powers, the Paris agreement
on the environment, and the seemingly unending
efforts to delegitimize current political institutions and
the founding values of the Republic. Without seeking
to address any of these controversies directly, it is
nonetheless clear that the strident clash of positions
threatens to unravel federalism, full faith and credit,
and integrity of national political fabric.
Federalism generally fosters a strong central
government and is the purveyor of unity within the
country. Current circumstances have shaken the very
foundation of well-settled political principles and
practices. The hostility and defiance are so intense
that they even raise the specter of secession. The
national government is likely strong enough to quell
any acts of true insurrection—so one hopes. The
policy on arbitration is part of the pursuit of national
goals and interests. It arose from federal efforts to
restore the right to redress grievances to the American
citizenship.137 Such an objective could not be attained
without the galvanizing force of federal preemption.
A cogent and uniform national law on arbitration was
instrumental to arbitral autonomy and the
effectiveness of the arbitral process.138 Effective
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 76 (4th ed. 2017).
137
Id.
138
See Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
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arbitral adjudication could not have been realized by a
weak federal policy. Without federalism and federal
preemption, U.S. citizenship would have been altered
and depreciated. While unitary national policies have
a negative impact on local rights, the addition of
federalized arbitration law to U.S. citizenship was
vital to its constitutional integrity. Effective civil
adjudication is an intrinsic and vital part of
democratic governance.
The McGill ruling advocates for a form of state
sovereignty and independence that undermines the
federalization of American arbitration law and the
arbitral process’ operational effectiveness. McGill
represents a larger decisional law that opposes the
intrusion of the ‘emphatic federal policy favoring
arbitration’ upon California state sovereignty and selfgovernance.139 The Ninth Circuit also has been part of
the resisting group. Its opinions indicate that the court
deeply resents the privatization of adjudication and
the substitution of arbitral methods for traditional
judicial procedures.140
Despite its long-standing opposition, the Ninth
Circuit appears to have reassessed—at least to some
extent—its position on the federalization issue. In
Kilgore v. KeyBank, N.A.,141 in contrast to the
reasoning in McGill, the Ninth Circuit held that the
FAA preempted the Broughton-Cruz rule, which
prohibited the arbitration of claims for injunctive
relief under the California Unfair Competition Law
139
140
141

McGill, 393 P.3d at 95.
See supra text accompanying note 15.
Kilgore v. KeyBank, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).
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(UCL).142 While avoiding a direct confrontation with
Kilgore, the McGill court reached a contrary result by
focusing on another aspect of the litigation. It drew a
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ injunctive
relief and aligned that distinction with an alleged
provision in the arbitration contract that extended the
waiver of ‘public injunctive relief’ to any type of
adjudicatory proceeding.143 Despite its conjectural
character, this reasoning allowed the state court to
attribute an inviolable public policy character to the
relevant consumer protection legislation and thereby
excluded it from the reach of arbitral jurisdiction. The
latter outcome directly contradicted the result
mandated by federal preemption.
In light of Kilgore and the current federal
arbitration practice,144 had the Ninth Circuit decided
McGill, in all likelihood, it would have commanded
that the question of arbitrability be submitted to the
arbitrator to determine the parties’ intent on this
California Code, Business and Professions Code – BPC
§17200, available at: http://codes.findlaw.com/ca/business-andprofessionscode/bpc-sect-17200.html; Kent J. Schmidt (Dorsey
& Whitney LLP), What is California’s Unfair Competition
Law?—the Michael Scott explanation, available at:
http://www.lexogy.com/library/detail.aspx? g=26df0acf-ef9d4ffa-8bcb-d59c0686837/; Carlton A. Varner & Thomas D.
Nevins, California Antitrust & Unfair Competition Law (3d ed.
2003); Jeremy B. Rosen, California: Unfair Competition Law,
in The Federalist Soc. State Ct. Doc. Watch Summer 2009,
available
142

at:http://www.horvitzlevy.com/horvitz/assets/dynapsis/attachment357.
pdf.
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McGill, 393 P.3d at 90-91.
See supra text accompanying note 141-43.
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question, as reflected in the contract for arbitration.
This outcome is the characteristic result in the federal
decisional law on arbitration, as confirmed by the
ruling in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter.145 In
contrast, the California Supreme Court in McGill
avoided assessing Kilgore and the arbitrability
question; rather, it cast the problem in terms of
limitations on contract freedom and the creation of
private rights. It determined that contracting parties
could not lawfully agree to waive their right to seek
public injunctive relief in all adjudicatory frameworks
because of the substantial public interest in the
regulatory law. The California statutes in question in
McGill were the following: the Consumers Legal
Remedies Act (CLRA); the unfair competition law
(UCL); and the false advertising law. Arbitrators
could not adjudicate or interfere with the political
rights that arose from the state’s exercise of
governmental authority on behalf of its citizens.146
The McGill court also believed that SCOTUS
exaggerated the significance of the FAA in its case
law. Implied by this perspective was the additional
view that the hyperbole that surrounded the FAA and
the ‘emphatic policy’ was more of a sales pitch than
serious analytical thinking.147 It may have been
wishful thinking, but the state court was convinced
that the reality of arbitration did not match the Court’s
description. Moreover, it was the state court’s
conviction that the public purpose underlying the laws
Oxford Health Plans, LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564 (2013).
McGill, 393 P.3d at 91-93.
147
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enacted by the state legislation could not be
diminished, frustrated, or contradicted by private
contractual references to arbitration.148 Additionally,
the court seemed to distrust the arbitrators’ ability to
apply the law, and to question the corporate parties’
motivation for their recourse to arbitration.149
Arbitration had become a means of avoiding judicial
rulings and legal remedies. In the court’s view, the
law should function to correct the inequality between
parties and the abuse of position by large commercial
enterprises.150
In addressing the issues in McGill, the state
court never acknowledged SCOTUS’ objective of
having arbitration provide citizens with a functional
and effective process of civil litigation. Also, it failed
to recognize that SCOTUS’ purpose in fostering
preemption was to create a single American
arbitration law. Fifty-one arbitration statutes would
create a horde of qualifications, exceptions, and
variations that would rob the arbitral process of its
autonomy and practical utility. Both the reasoning and
result in McGill are foregone conclusions calculated
to conceal, but also to achieve, the aim of
reintegrating state sovereignty and law into the
regulation of arbitration.
In McGill, Sharon McGill was a Citibank credit
card customer. On the basis of that status,151 she
purchased insurance from Citibank, known as a
McGill, 393 P.3d at 94, 95.
Id. at 93-94.
150
Id. at 93.
151
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“credit protection plan,” which was intended to
provide customers with insurance protection from
catastrophic events that prevented them from earning
an income or a sufficient one (e.g., unemployment,
hospitalization, divorce, or long-term disability).
McGill paid a monthly premium to Citibank for the
plan, the amount of which was based upon her credit
card balance: the higher the debt, the greater the risk,
and the more costly the premium.
In 2001 and 2005, Citibank issued a notice of
change to the terms and conditions of credit card
accounts. In 2001, the company added a number of
arbitral clauses to cover various aspects of the
commercial relationship. These clauses allowed either
party to file a demand for the arbitration of “any claim
. . . [or] dispute,” attributed to the arbitrator the
authority to interpret the arbitration agreement,
broadly defined the types of claims that were
arbitrable, and prohibited any type of class or
representative action.
Both the 2001 and 2005 notice contained ‘optout’ provisions. These agreements had become a
commonplace feature in adhesive arbitration
agreements because the California courts often
concluded that these agreements rectified the
bargaining imbalance between the parties. They
permitted the customer to reject the proffered arbitral
clause and to use the credit card for the remainder of
the contract term. McGill did not exercise her ‘optout’ privilege in either circumstance.
A curious feature of the litigation record noted
and emphasized by the state court was the accord
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reached by the parties during court proceedings. They
allegedly agreed that the various arbitration
agreements prohibited customers “from pursuing
claims for public injunctive relief, not just in
arbitration, but in any forum [including a court of
law].”152 [Emphasis in the original]. This statement
would prove decisive to the outcome of the case.
Having lost her job in 2008, McGill began to
incur higher amounts of debt on her card. In 2011, she
filed a class action against Citibank because of the
way it marketed the customer protection plan and how
it processed McGill’s individual claim. She contended
that Citibank engaged in deceptive advertising and
violated the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA),
the California Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and
the California False Advertising Law. The trial court
ordered McGill to arbitrate her claims except those in
which she sought public injunctive relief. The
appellate court reversed that decision, concluding that
McGill should arbitrate all of her claims against
Citibank. It asserted that the SCOTUS ruling in AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion153 preempted the so-called
Broughton-Cruz rule that had prohibited the
arbitration of claims for public injunctive relief.154
On appeal, the California High Court dismissed
McGill’s first claim by refusing to address it on the
basis that it was unnecessary to the litigation and
unsupported by the facts. She had asserted that,
contrary to the appellate court’s determination, the
McGill, 393 P.3d at 87.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
154
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FAA did not preempt the Broughton-Cruz rule of
inarbitrability.155 The state court may have wanted to
avoid addressing the Broughton-Cruz rule issue, not
because it fell outside the factual perimeter of the
case, but rather because it did not want to affirm an
arbitrability ruling with which it took exception
(perhaps strong exception): that injunctive relief under
California statutory was arbitrable. The BroughtonCruz controversy could be avoided or ignored because
McGill’s second question resolved the entire litigation
on its own and in a manner that conformed to the state
court’s view of what a ‘correct result’ should be.
In the second branch of her appeal, McGill
argued that the arbitration agreements in the standard
form bank service contract were unenforceable
because they coerced her into surrendering completely
“her right to seek public injunctive relief . . . .”156
Although the record was devoid of direct
substantiation, Citibank, according to the court,
agreed with McGill’s representation about the arbitral
clauses. The only textual representation made in the
opinion about the would-be party agreement was the
statement that “ . . . as Citibank states, the parties
elected . . . to exclude public injunctive relief from
arbitration . . . .”157 Rather than a mutual agreement to
have the customer’s right to public injunctive relief
waived in all adjudicatory settings, the parties
appeared to engage in an effort to avoid most of the
Broughton-Cruz inarbitrability rule and thereafter to
McGill, 393 P.3d at 88.
Id.
157
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have recourse to arbitration on all issues. Contrary to
the court’s interpretation, the would-be party
agreement did not support the claim that the customer
should be deprived completely of any right to seek
public injunctive relief. It is unclear how the court
arrived at its conclusion or what the parties might
have intended.
The court’s interpretation of the McGill case’s
second question was a means by which it could
address the uneasy relationship between public
regulation and private rights in arbitration doctrine. In
effect, the court gave itself the opportunity to tackle
the federal preemption of the Broughton-Cruz
inarbitrability rule by ricochet, masking its
conclusions on that issue as part of its resolution of
the other issue of litigation. The state court first noted
that all three consumer protection statutes that
provided the foundation for McGill’s claim
invalidated consumer waivers of the statutory
protection because such waivers were “contrary to
public policy and [were] unenforceable and void.”158
Moreover, at least one of the statutes—the false
advertising law—gave standing to both government
officials and aggrieved customers to seek relief under
its framework. This factor reinforced the public policy
character of the enactment.159
The court then appropriated and expounded
upon a distinction made in Broughton-Cruz between
‘private injunctive relief’ and ‘public injunctive
relief.’ The former resolved private disputes, and the
158
159
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latter mostly benefitted the public as a whole and only
“incidentally” (“if at all”) individual private citizens:
“ . . . public injunctive relief under the UCL, the
CLRA, and the false advertising law is relief that has
‘the primary purpose and effect’ of prohibiting
unlawful acts that threaten future injury to the general
public. . . .”160 With this observation, the court
ascended to the pulpit of public policy, so it could
rescue the hapless and unfortunate customer from the
abusive and self-interested behavior of the private
bank.
If the adhesive arbitration agreement
completely excluded the parties’ right to pursue
public injunctive relief, the court would be justified in
declaring the arbitral clause invalid and unenforceable
under state law. The waiver of public injunctive relief
through an arbitral clause “would seriously
compromise the public purpose the statutes were
intended to serve.”161 Under the California Code, “. . .
a law established for a public reason [could] not be
contravened by a private agreement.”162 The latter
statement is a familiar principle in civil law legal
systems. In contrast to their common law
counterparts, civilian legal systems give both the law
and traditional litigation the highest station in the
legal process.163 Moreover, as stated earlier, the public
McGill, 393 P.3d at 90.
McGill, 393 P.3d at 94.
162
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injunctive relief available under the CLRA, UCL, and
the ‘false advertising’ law were “primarily ‘for the
benefit of the general public’. . . .”164
The California Supreme Court then advanced
several criticisms of the federal policy and doctrine on
arbitration, even though it was only addressing
McGill’s second argument which related to contract
language. The state court argued that the federal
doctrine on arbitration was based upon an “overbroad
view of the FAA.”165 In interpreting the FAA, the
state court advised federal courts to place greater
emphasis on the ‘savings clause’ in FAA §2,
providing that arbitration contracts were subject to
ordinary contract defenses like unconscionability.166
The ‘savings clause’ opened the door to state contract
law and the unconscionability defense prohibiting
arbitration agreements from forcing a contracting
party to waive a public law right.
Moreover, in virtually complete contradiction
with the SCOTUS case law, the state court asserted
that the congressional purpose underlying the FAA
CivilLawTraditions.html; Civil law systems and Mixed Systems
with
a
Civil
Law
Tradition,
available
at:
http://www.juriglobe.ca/eng/sys-juri/class-poli/droit-civil.php;
Pyall Syam, What is the Difference Between Common Law and
Civil
Law?,
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law
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was to “‘make arbitration agreements . . . as
enforceable as other contracts, but . . . [not] more
so.’”167 Legal rights that proceed from statutory
enactments reflect the expression of public political
authority. The court then made the highly suspect,
likely inaccurate, contention that the FAA did not
command the enforcement of arbitration agreements if
those agreements contradicted or extinguished
statutory rights.168 The application of an arbitration
agreement could not deprive a contracting party of its
statutory rights. When the government acted, it acted
on behalf of all of its citizens.169 The California vision
of the law, courts, and arbitration differed radically
from the federal analogue propounded by SCOTUS.
(iii) Sanchez v. Valencia
In Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co.,170 the
California Supreme Court demonstrated an
uncharacteristically accommodative attitude toward
an arbitral clause in a consumer transaction. As in
other similar cases, the critical question of legal
doctrine centered upon the integration of the
SCOTUS decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion171
into (and its impact upon) the California state
regulation of consumer transactions involving
McGill, 393 P.3d at 94.
Id.
169
Id. at 94. 95.
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arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to
compel arbitration, ruling that the class waiver and the
remainder of the arbitration agreement were
unenforceable. The court of appeals did not rule on
the validity of the class action waiver, but concluded
that both a provision for internal arbitral appeal and
the arbitration agreement “as a whole” were
“unconscionably
one-sided”
and,
therefore,
172
unenforceable.
At the outset of the opinion, the California
Supreme Court expressed guarded approval of the
decision in Concepcion by emphasizing its limited
impact upon the state regulation of arbitration:
While circumscribing the ability of
states to regulate the fairness of
arbitration agreements, Concepcion
reaffirmed that the FAA does not
preempt “‘generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability.’” . . . Under the FAA,
these defenses may provide grounds for
invalidating an arbitration agreement if
they are enforced evenhandedly and do
not “interfere [] with fundamental
attributes of arbitration.”173
Therefore, the state regulation of arbitration was
subject to federal preemption only if state rules
overtly disfavored arbitration (arbitral autonomy, or
172
173
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arbitrability) by imposing special requirements on
arbitration contracts or placing restrictions that
interfered with the primary attributes of arbitration.
The circumstances of Sanchez involved the
purchase of a luxury car by a consumer (Gil Sanchez)
from a California dealership (Valencia Holding
Company of Valencia).174 The purchase price was
nearly $54,000. The sales contract contained a
relatively elaborate sui generis provision for
arbitration, indicating that the dealership crafted the
provision over time to reflect prior sales experience
and avoid previous problems. The purchaser alleged
that, at the time of sale, he had been inundated with
documents which he was instructed to sign. The
salesperson did not explain what the documents were
but simply indicated where Sanchez needed to sign.
Sanchez signed the documents without reading them.
There was no opportunity whatsoever to negotiate.
In particular, none of the dealership personnel
alerted Sanchez to the presence of an arbitral clause or
explained what the reference to arbitration meant or
entailed in terms of consequences.175 The arbitral
clause contained a class action waiver, required that
the arbitrators—who would be selected according to
the applicable arbitral rules—be “attorneys or retired
judges” who would rule pursuant to law. The arbitral
proceeding would be conducted in the federal district
in which the purchaser resided. There could be two
distinct but related arbitrations. The first arbitration
was the standard proceeding, which applied to the
174
175
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adjudication of disputes that arose from the
contractual relationship. Given the parties’ disparity
of position, the dealership (if requested) was obligated
to advance the buyer’s share of the costs of the
arbitration with a maximum of $2500. The arbitrator
could return the advance to either party at the time of
the award. If authorized by the governing law, the
arbitrator could also apply a ‘loser pays’ formula to
the allocation of costs.176
The second arbitration was an appellate
proceeding that could be invoked only in two sets of
circumstances by the affected party: (1) if the winning
party in the standard proceeding did not receive
monetary relief, or (2) if the losing party in that
proceeding was ordered to pay damages in excess of
$100,000 or the award contained injunctive relief.
Moreover, an award of punitive damages could be retried by a three-member arbitral tribunal. The
requesting party would be responsible for the fees and
costs of arbitration subject to possible later
reapportionment by the arbitral tribunals. The parties
further stipulated that arbitrations held under the
agreement would be “governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act.”177
The arbitral procedure described in the
adhesive arbitral clause contained protections for both
parties (but to different degrees and for different
reasons). The parties’ position in the contract
relationship identified which provisions had been
written to benefit them in particular. The first ground
176
177
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for arbitral appeal could only be used by the buyer,
and the second ground was likely to be used only by
the seller. The advance of costs partly assisted the
buyer who was forced to arbitrate, and the possibility
of an eventual reimbursement of the advance in the
award protected or favored the seller’s interests. Three
factors indicated that the drafting party was
determined to avoid the legal process and legal
procedures because they believed they were
antagonistic to its business interests: (1) the reference
to punitive damages and injunctive relief, (2) the
requirement that arbitrators be experienced legal
professionals, and (3) the class action waiver.
The provisions, however, also expressed a
distrust of arbitrators by requiring legal accuracy and
correctness in their rulings. This requirement limited
the arbitrators’ decisional discretion. These attributes
of the arbitral clause indicated that the choice of
arbitration was unilateral and one-sided—intended to
protect primarily the seller’s interests. The
consumer’s interests were present but much less
apparent. To the extent that the arbitral provisions
provided access to expert, efficient, economical, and
enforceable adjudication, they benefited both
parties.178
Regardless of its real or theoretical benefits, the
adhesive agreement for arbitration had little in
common with a bilateral bargain. The parties’ ‘right to
arbitrate,’ therefore, was unaffected by the party
recourse to other remedies. In the face of the exercise
178
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of other contractual remedies, the ‘agreed-upon’
obligation to arbitrate disputes became merely an
option (a discretionary right) and was not a binding
legal duty. The arbitral clause was not a ‘tiered’
agreement, but rather a statement of options,
depending upon how the parties (individually or
collectively)
evaluated
the
circumstances.
Additionally, the arbitral clause would survive the
lapsing, termination, or completion of the contract and
the transaction, so any prospective or unresolved
disputes would be submitted to arbitration. The
obligation to arbitrate, in effect, transcended the
contract and even the transaction. In the event that
part of the arbitral clause was invalidated, the
remainder of the clause could be enforced. If,
however, the class action waiver was nullified, the
entire arbitral clause would be nullified. The class
waiver was absolutely material and indispensable to
the bargain. In effect, the parties ‘agreed’ that any
class litigation would be heard exclusively by a
court.179
The remainder of the arbitral clause described
other forms of alternative non-judicial relief that
‘coexisted’ with the parties’ ‘agreement’ to have
recourse to arbitration. The parties could still have
recourse to ‘self-help’ remedies, which again
appeared to favor the drafting party more than the
consumer. For example, repossession was authorized;
it was a procedure of benefit exclusively to the car
dealership. It hardly enabled the car buyer. Another
179
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exemption from the obligation to arbitrate was the
right to have recourse to small claims court
proceedings, unless such a course of conduct would
lead to the transfer of the dispute to another court. The
sales contract was a one-page, double-sided document
with small margins. It was thick with provisions. The
bottom of the front page contained signatures, and a
box with a black outline highlighted the arbitral clause
on the bottom of the back page.180
The court of appeals concluded that the
arbitration agreement, especially the arbitral appeal
provision, was “unconscionably one-sided.”181 As a
whole, the arbitral agreement placed “an unduly
oppressive burden on the buyer.”182 The court
identified four aspects of the arbitration agreement
that “made the agreement unfairly one-sided in favor
of”183 the car dealership: (1) the possibility of appeal
to a three-member tribunal when the arbitrators
awarded more than $100,000; (2) the same possibility
of appeal when the award included injunctive relief;
(3) the requirement that the appealing party pay the
costs of arbitration in advance; and (4) the exclusion
of repossession from the arbitral procedure while
submitting demands for injunctive relief. Each of
these features favored primarily, even exclusively, the
dealership’s position and interests.184
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The court began its analysis with a thorough
discussion of the California law of unconscionability.
It cited a group of significant state cases on
unconscionability.185 The court adopted a wellreasoned approach to defining the term
‘unconscionability.’ It emphasized that the meaning
of the term was largely dependent upon
circumstances. “An evaluation of unconscionability is
highly dependent on context.”186 A definition was
determined by a “sliding scale”187 that resulted from
changes in the facts of the case and the interests of the
parties. The controlling doctrine was well-settled;
unconscionability consisted of two components—one
procedural and the other substantive. How these
Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109
(2013) (Sonic II); Armendariz v. Fd. Health Psychare Serv.,
Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83 (2000); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. 4th
1519 (1997); Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 223
(2012); Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt.
Develop., 55 Cal. 4th 223 (2012); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank,
38 Cal. 3d 913 (1985); Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d
807 (1981); Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.
4th 906 (2001); City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.
4th 747 (2007); Mareno v. Sanchez, 106 Cal. App. 4th 1415
(2003); Smith, Valentine & Smith, Inc. v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. 3d 491 (1976); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
4th 148 (2005); Madden v. Kaiser Fd. Hosp., 17 Cal. 3d 699
(1976); Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007); Saika
v. Gold, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1074 (1996); Gutierre v. Autowest,
Inc. 114 Cal. App. 4th 77 (2003); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 97
Cal. App. 4th 1094 (2002); Engalla v. Permanente Medical
Group, Inc., 15 Cal. 4th 951 (1997).
186
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components interrelated varied in different situations.
“[T]he more substantively oppressive the contract
term,
the
less
evidence
of
procedural
188
unconscionability [was] required . . . .”
Adhesion
and unilateralism (take-it-or-leave-it or all-or-nothing
‘bargains’) epitomized procedural unfairness in
contract, and oppressive terms unacceptable to any
reasonable person best described substantive
unconscionability. Unconscionability could arise from
a single contract provision or from the contract as a
whole. It signified a coercive bargain that was a ‘bad
deal’ for the weaker party—that, in fact, negated most
of its interests and enhanced substantially those of the
party who benefited from the bargain.189
The court asserted that a multitude of phrases
hover around the idea of unconscionability, but they
all fail to alight upon a true definition. The court
mentioned a litany of “nonexclusive formulations” in
its perusal of the case law: terms that are overly harsh,
unduly oppressive, unreasonably favorable, unfairly
one-sided, or shock the conscience.190 The law had
been unable to identify a fully dispositive single
expression or conclusive factor. The court sorted
through the redundant and inconclusive phraseology
by focusing upon an analytical framework (“[n]ot all
one-sided contract provisions are unconscionable . .
.”)191 and commercial utility, which it described as
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“the mores and business practices of the time and
place”:192
Commerce depends on the
enforceability, in most instances, of a
duly executed written contract. A party
cannot avoid a contractual obligation
merely by complaining that the deal, in
retrospect, was an unfair or bad
bargain.193
***
a contract can provide a ‘margin of
safety’ that provides the party with
superior bargaining strength a type of
extra protection for which it has a
legitimate commercial need without
being unconscionable.194
The objective was to reach beyond “a simple
old-fashioned bad bargain.”195 “Concepcion clarifies
the limits the FAA places on state unconscionability
rules as they pertain to arbitration agreements.”196 In
arbitration cases, state unconscionability rules were
subject to further limitations. They could not regulate
arbitration contracts differently from other contracts
Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 749.
Id.
194
Id.
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196
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or discriminate against them in the application of law:
“even when facially nondiscriminatory, [such rules]
must not disfavor arbitration as applied by imposing
procedural requirements that ‘interfere [] with
fundamental attributes of arbitration’ . . . .”197 Further,
these rules must be “enforced evenhandedly.”198
The court examined a number of considerations
that might render the arbitration agreement so onesided that it became unconscionable. In each case, the
court concluded that the potential unfairness was
inadequate to invalidate the arbitration agreement.
Procedural unconscionability by itself was insufficient
to render an arbitration agreement unenforceable. It
only required that the court examine vigorously the
terms of the contract for oppression of the weaker,
imposed-upon party’s interests.199 The court
determined that the one-sided features of the arbitral
clause in the sales contract—in particular, the poison
pill aspect of the class waiver provision and the selfhelp remedies—were justified by their necessity in the
business context and by the SCOTUS decision in
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.200
The court also addressed the recently-enacted
state legislative requirement that arbitration be
affordable to the weaker, imposed-upon party. It
concluded that the standard demanded a serious
evidentiary showing (which the plaintiff had not
done). The purchase of a luxury car was hardly the
Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 750.
Id.
199
Id. at 751.
200
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
197
198
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setting in which to accomplish the legislative goal of
protecting the consumer who was relatively
impecunious. The contract provision against
injunctive relief was also justified because the
granting of such a remedy could have a substantial,
long-term negative effect on a business.201
The court avoided addressing the status of the
Broughton-Cruz rule, but nonetheless concluded that
the rules of unconscionability must be enforced evenhandedly and could not disfavor arbitration in
particular or interfere with its fundamental
attributes.202 In this consumer arbitration case the
California court rendered an opinion that was
respectful of federal law, federal preemption, and the
federal policy on arbitration. When compared to the
court’s other rulings, it was an uncharacteristic
opinion.
(iv) More Movement in the Other Direction
Two recent decisions, one rendered by the
California Supreme Court and the other by the Ninth
Circuit, suggest a possible shift in California law
toward a more complete and less acrimonious
acceptance of federalization and the federal doctrine
on arbitration. In Sandquist v. Lebo Auto,203 the
California Supreme Court rendered an opinion in
which it applied the principles and rules articulated by
SCOTUS in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,
Sanchez, 353 P.3d at 753.
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and then in a group of cases consisting of Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, Oxford Health Plan, LLC v. Sutter, and BG
Group v. Argentina—cases that address the authority
of courts and arbitrators to decide threshold
jurisdictional issues in the arbitral process—in a
straightforward and even cordial manner.204 The court
did not elaborate any undermining distinctions to
block the application of the federal law on arbitration.
The state court’s discussion was in ‘lock-step’ with
SCOTUS doctrine—especially the most recent
holdings. The court asserted that the arbitrators had
decided the disputes that the parties submitted to
them—in particular, whether their arbitration
agreement permitted or prohibited class action.
Only the parties could eliminate the arbitrator’s
threshold jurisdictional authority through their
agreement. Unless the parties agreed to a Kaplan
jurisdictional delegation clause, the court’s role was to
decide whether the parties had entered into a valid
agreement to arbitrate. The state court also embraced
the Stolt-Nielsen–Concepcion assessment of class
action in arbitration—i.e., the recourse to class
arbitration
negated
arbitration’s
informality,
flexibility, economy, and expedition. Given the
complex character of class proceedings, class
arbitration also made procedural objections more
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938
(1995); see BG Group v. Argentina, 572 U.S. 25 (2014); Oxford
Health Plan, LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Green Tree
Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2002); Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
204
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likely and enhanced the risk of loss for the defendants
because of the lack of judicial review. The clash in
remedial character made class arbitration an
inapposite substitute for bilateral arbitration. Linking
arbitration and collective lawsuits, therefore, was
oxymoronic.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged in greater
detail the unexpected and significant alterations in
California arbitration law. In Tompkins v. 23 and Me,
Inc.,205 the court engaged in a lengthy comparison of
the federal and California law of arbitration with
particular emphasis upon the decisions of the
California Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit first
referred to the SCOTUS decisional law on arbitration,
reaching the following conclusions:
1.
The FAA, in particular Section
Two,
embodies
a
congressional
declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration. As a result, the
FAA’s primary objective is to secure the
enforcement of arbitration agreements as
they are written by the contracting
parties. A rigorous enforcement policy
will give effect to the party intent to have
access to expeditious, efficient, effective,
and economical proceedings.
2.
Judicial
precedent
clearly
establishes that the FAA’s national
205
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policy favoring arbitration also applies to
the states and, in particular, to state
courts.
3.
The FAA prohibits any state law
encroachment on the federal regulation
of arbitration—either in the form of
legislation
directly
or
indirectly
antagonistic to arbitration or through
common law principles [i.e., decisional
law, court rulings] that interfere with the
enforcement of arbitration agreements
according to their terms.
4.
The ‘savings clause’ is the only
exception in the FAA to the validity of
arbitration agreements.
5.
The application of the contract
defenses in the ‘savings clause’ cannot
disfavor arbitration clauses in particular
or have a disproportionate impact upon
arbitration agreements.206
The Ninth Circuit’s assertions accurately
restate
the
federal
law
on
arbitration.
Unconscionability is obviously a matter of state
contract law, but it establishes a potentially
considerable limitation on arbitrability which the
court represents as being difficult to establish under
206
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state law. The court then outlines the essential
principles of arbitration that it believes have been
articulated by the California Supreme Court:
1.
In adhesive arbitration, the law of
unconscionability is the principal
‘savings
clause’
restriction
on
arbitrability. Under California law,
unconscionability is established by
fulfilling two requirements:
first, a
procedural component that evaluates the
parties’ unequal bargaining power from
the perspective of oppression or surprise;
second, a substantive component that
assesses whether the unilateral ‘bargain’
yields overly harsh one-sided results.
Both components must be present, but
need not influence the transaction to the
same degree. A bit more of one can
counterbalance a lack in the other.
2.
Under California contract law,
‘substantive’ unconscionability does not
protect parties against a “simple oldfashioned bad bargain” that they
negotiated and to which they consented.
It provides relief from terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the more
powerful party. Moreover, the ‘context’
of the transaction is critical to
determinations of unconscionability.
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3.
The
contract
defense
of
unconscionability
applies
indistinguishably to arbitration and nonarbitration contracts.
4.
The contracting parties to an
arbitration agreement may validly agree
that the prevailing party shall be awarded
attorney’s fees regardless of whether the
dispute sounds in tort or contract.
5.
California Civil Code §1717 seems
to validate ‘prevailing party clauses’
because it requires courts to consider all
such clauses as bilateral provisions. This
rule also applies to adhesive contracts.
6.
In
mandatory
arbitration—
meaning either unilaterally-imposed
employment or consumer contracts in
which the parties are uneven, the costs
borne by the weaker party cannot exceed
the court costs for such an action.
7.
The
Armendariz
rule
for
procedural fairness in arbitration
proceedings is restricted to cases
involving employment disputes.
8.
In consumer transactions, feeshifting clauses are not unconscionable
unless the challenging party establishes
75

that appellate fees and costs, in fact, are
unaffordable by the party and create a
substantial deterrent effect to pursuing
the action.
9.
The filing fees for arbitration
(usually involving deposits for arbitrator
administrator fees) are unenforceable if
they are prohibitively high and thereby
block all forms of redress, including
arbitration.
10. The California High Court has reevaluated the assumptions underlying its
ruling in Armendariz to the effect that
arbitration was an inferior form of
adjudication. The court has asserted that,
under both California and federal law,
arbitral adjudication and judicial
litigation are co-equal processes;
substituting one for the other does not
generate a disadvantage for either party.
Any characterization by a state court or
under state law that arbitration is a
unique form of dispute resolution and,
therefore, is unconscionable because it
insufficiently protects legal rights is
untenable.
11. The state court has also established
that a one-sided contract is not
necessarily
or
presumptively
76

unconscionable. Such a contract can give
the stronger party a ‘margin of safety’ or
‘extra protection’ mandated by that
party’s business activity. A one-sided
contract is, therefore, not ipso facto
unconscionable; in fact, the presumption
goes toward the validity of such
agreements.
12. The state court has also
acknowledged the separability doctrine
and its beneficial impact on arbitral
autonomy. A party opposing arbitration
on the basis of contract validity must
attack the arbitral clause directly.
Moreover, the question of the validity of
the arbitral clause shall be decided by the
arbitrator.207
There are evident problems of definition
created by the generality of the propositions
(especially the first two, i.e., how do unreasonably
unfavorable terms differ from ‘an old-fashion bad
bargain’ and how is the proportionality between the
two components of unconscionability to be
measured). The foregoing assessment of the
Californian judicial posture on arbitration differs
substantially from the previous statement of the state
law. It argues that the relevant California case law is a
mirror image of its federal counterpart. The state law
207
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seems not only to embrace, but also to reinforce, the
federalization of U.S. arbitration law as well as the
attendant preemption doctrine.
There are at least two factors that dampen the
positive appraisal of the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of
the law. The federal court has only a territorial
connection to the state law and has no real
institutional standing to establish its content. It would
have been more persuasive to read about the
acceptance of the federal law principles in a California
Supreme Court opinion. Be that as it may, the Ninth
Circuit has persistently resisted the federal case law
on arbitration and challenged its preemptive
hegemony. The assessment, presuming it is highly
likely to be accurate, may at least indicate the prospect
of a fundamental change in California Ninth Circuit
law.
The second factor of concern is, if there is
change, is it merely episodic or a permanent shift of
direction? Sandquist was unusual because of its
conformity to federal law principles on arbitration. On
the one hand, it may lack convincing precedential
value. On the other hand, it could signal a moderation
of the California judiciary’s antagonism toward
federalized arbitration. Subduing the antagonism
would greatly solidify the foundation of federal
arbitration law and contribute substantially to arbitral
autonomy. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit’s recent
decision on class waivers favoring the NLRB’s
position establishes that there are other points of
serious federal dissent from the consecrated principles
of the federal stance on arbitration. SCOTUS has
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granted certiorari to a group of federal court cases
that have addressed the NLRB position on class
waivers.
(v) Florida: Basulto v. Hialeah
The Supreme Court of Florida made a
contribution to the growing state supreme court case
law on arbitration. The court focused less on
federalism and federal preemption. Instead, they
concentrated on adhesive contracts for arbitration and
formation and fairness issues. In Basulto v. Hialeah
Auto,208 the court applied the controlling Florida
precedent on the issue of unconscionability related to
a motion to compel arbitration.209 An unconscionable
arbitration agreement cannot support a motion to
compel. The case involved Cuban immigrants who
purchased a car from a dealership in Miami. Because
the buyers neither spoke nor understood English, they
were not aware of the terms of the sales contract and
the arbitral clause it contained. In light of these
circumstances, the Florida High Court concluded that
the arbitration agreement was unenforceable—either
an arbitration agreement did not physically exist, or it
was
both
procedurally
and
substantively
210
unconscionable.
The court was preoccupied with the would-be
injustice of the circumstances. It never focused on the
208
209
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legal questions generated by the facts. It did not
consider the question of whether (and on what basis)
arbitration was unsuitable for these consumers. At the
very least, they knew they were buying a car. How
much knowledge was enough? It also never raised the
question of whether the issue of arbitrability should be
decided by a court or submitted to an arbitrator
appointed pursuant to the arbitral clause. As in
Buckeye Check Cashing,211 the result was
unequivocally clear to the court; the law mandated
only one possible legal outcome. It freed the
consumers of any responsibility because it believed
that the agreement and transaction were void ab
initio.212 The court’s decisiveness at least implied that
the court believed that the consumers and their
interests could only be safeguarded by the law and
courts. The FAA would have preempted that belief
and legal conclusion.
What Florida law provides or how the courts
apply it in these circumstances may violate the
supremacy of the FAA—even though a state court is
applying state law in a state case to a state transaction.
There is no safe haven from the reach of the federal
law of arbitration—except possibly the parties’
agreement when it seeks to contradict itself on the
issue of arbitration and arbitrability. Be that as it may,
the Florida court never referred to the supremacy of
federal arbitration law, the ‘emphatic federal policy
favoring arbitration,’ or the valuable role and impact
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. V. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440
(2006).
212
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211
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of arbitration on consumer arbitration. The court only
saw a denial of fairness to resident aliens (perhaps
also either nationals or tourists) who did not speak
English. It concluded that the failure of Englishlanguage communications meant that the parties had
not entered into a contract or agreed to arbitration.
“Because the buyers have not agreed to the arbitration
terms within the Clause, they cannot be compelled to
arbitrate their claims for monetary relief.”213
This outcome may have been possible under
Florida law, but the result was extremely unlikely to
be reached under the FAA by the U.S. Supreme
Court. The solution under Kaplan,214 Bazzle,215 and
Sutter216 would have been to submit the arbitrability
question to the arbitrator or to follow whatever
prescription, if any, was contained in the parties’
agreement. The opportunity the consumers had to read
the document or to retain a translator or to engage in
the transaction with bilingual friends may have been
enough to resolve any judicial question about the
enforceability of the contract, leaving the matter of its
binding character or the meaning of its contents to the
arbitrator. The rule of federal law is that the courts
should not intrude upon the sovereignty of the process
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or of the arbitrator.217 The parties’ bargain is for
arbitration, not judicial reasoning or results—unless
the trial of arbitration is imbued with flagrant abuse or
fundamental corruption. The Florida court’s decision
strays far afield from those unambiguous and
unyielding principles of federal arbitration law.218
See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ARBITRATION LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 90 (4th ed. 2017).
218
See also Raymond James Fin. Serv. Inc. v. Phillips, 38
Fla. L. Weekly S 325 (Fla. 2013) (a Florida statute of
limitations applies to an arbitral proceeding because the latter
is a “civil action or proceeding” under the Fla. Stat. §95.11.)
(Under the court’s analysis and its consultation of the “ordinary
dictionary definition” of the undefined statutory term
‘proceeding’, proceeding refers to a “tribunal” which then
becomes “a court or other adjudicatory body” which finally can
be described as an arbitral proceeding or arbitration.
Therefore, the statutory phrase “civil action or proceeding”
referred to adjudicatory bodies, a group that jesuitically
interpreted included arbitral tribunals. By its own terms, the
statute of limitations applied to arbitral proceedings.) (Instead
of engaging in this mechanical, superficial, artificial
discussion, the court should have discovered the true character
of arbitration for purposes of applying state law. The
‘emphatic federal policy favoring arbitration’ establishes the
attributes of arbitration for purposes of federal preemption and
the application of state law. The state statute of limitations,
unless specifically chosen by the parties, placed restraints on
the recourse to arbitration and the validity of the arbitration
agreement. It thereby encumbered the parties’ right to arbitrate
under FAA §2 and did so on the basis of a forced and
implausible statutory construction.). See also Nappa Const.
Mgmt., LLC v. Flynn, 2017 R.I. LEXIS 13, in which the court
used the Stolt-Nielsen redefinition and expansion of the excess
of authority ground in FAA §10 to permit judicial
disagreement with and reversal of the arbitrator’s ruling on the
217
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(vi) SCOTUS:
DIRECTV v. Imburgia
Thereafter, in DIRECTV v. Imburgia,219
SCOTUS underscored its commitment to the doctrine
it articulated in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion220 on
consumer arbitration and class action waivers. In
doing so, it affirmed the strength of the federal
preemption doctrine in American arbitration law and
the absolute authority of the FAA and the emphatic
federal policy. In the state litigation, the California
Court of Appeal devised a strained distinction in an
attempt to circumvent federal preemption through the
application of contract freedom. The state court
wanted to salvage the role of state law in the
regulation of arbitration beyond supplying the rules
for contract formation and validity. It also wanted to
limit the impact of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion on
the matters pertaining to consumer protection and the
vindication of consumer interests.221
The state court action was brought by two
DIRECTV customers (Amy Imburgia and Kathy
Greiner) who alleged that the company’s imposition
merits. See also Noble v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,
2017 B L 66251 (3d Cir. 03/03/2017 (unpub.) (consumer
bought a Samsung Galaxy Gear S Smartwatch and was given a
warranty booklet; because the arbitration agreement was
‘buried’ in the warranty booklet, it was unenforceable).
219
DIRECTV, Inc., v. Impgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
220
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221
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of early termination fees violated California law.
DIRECTV made a motion to remove the matter to
arbitration pursuant to a clause in the service contract;
the state court denied the motion. DIRECTV filed an
appeal.222 The contract contained a standard provision
for arbitration: “any Claim either of us asserts will be
resolved only by binding arbitration . . . .” It also
contained a class arbitration waiver: “[n]either you
nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate claims
in arbitration.”223 The effect of both provisions was to
eliminate any possibility of class litigation between
the contracting parties. The contract then stated that, if
the “law of your [customer’s] state” nullified class
waivers, it voided entirely the arbitral clause.224 In
other words, if arbitration did not prevent class
litigation, DIRECTV saw no benefit to arbitration and
would have recourse to the courts. The California
court somehow reached the conclusion that the phrase
“law of your state” meant California law prior to the
decision in Concepcion.225 Thereby, the contracting
parties had deliberately agreed to have their contract
governed by a historically-dated legal rule that
expressly ignored developments in federal law that
voided the legitimacy of the earlier law.
The provisions of California law that the court
of appeal wanted to retain at all costs were twofold:
the Discover Bank Rule and provisions in the
California Consumers Legal Remedies Act (§§ 1751,
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 463.
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 466.
224
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225
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222
223

84

1781[a]). Both of these frameworks included legal
rules that voided class action waivers and protected
the consumers’ right to engage in ‘representative’
litigation.226 Of course, Concepcion had only recently
declared that class waivers in consumer contracts of
adhesion were lawful and enforceable agreements
pursuant to the FAA. The state court emphasized
freedom of contract and choice-of-law to
‘manufacture’ a make-weight argument that the
reference to the “law of your state” meant the
California law prior to the Concepcion validation of
class waivers. In effect, if the parties agreed, they
could select as the law applicable an historical version
of the law of a state (or of a country or of another
entity).
This position, supplemented by a few rules of
construction and the view that would-be ambiguity is
counted against the contract drafter (DIRECTV), lead
to the contrived conclusion that the parties, as they
were entitled to do, could choose to be governed by a
dated state law.227 The reasoning was tortured,
transparent, and tendentious. The objective was to
unseat the hegemony of federal law in the field of
arbitration and to allow California to establish and
apply its own standards in arbitration cases.
The California Supreme Court did not grant
discretionary review to the ruling, and even the Ninth
Circuit could not endorse the court of appeal’s
reasoning and conclusion. The case hardly posed an
obstacle to SCOTUS and its arbitration doctrine. The
226
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Court acknowledged that contract freedom was a vital
principle of arbitration (to which the FAA gave
“considerable latitude”) and that the interpretation of
state law belonged to state courts. The state law,
however, could not contradict and had to be
“consistent with Federal Arbitration.”228 Moreover,
federal law was supreme and binding on state courts:
“consequently, the judges of every State must follow
it.”229 In particular, “The Federal Arbitration Act is a
law of the United States, and Concepcion is an
authoritative interpretation of that Act.”230
The Court surmised that the state court would
not have engaged in a similar analysis in regard to any
other contract. Such a ruling imposed special validity
requirements on arbitration contracts exclusively:
“[W]e conclude that California courts would not
interpret contracts other than arbitration contracts the
same way . . . . [T]he court’s interpretation of this
arbitration contract is unique, restricted to that
field.”231 This unique interpretation exhibits a
particular animus toward the FAA, which eviscerates
the role of state law in the regulation of arbitration.
The state court decision was an intrusion and a
trespass on federal authority. Moreover, the
construction applied only to arbitration in a vain
attempt to undo its impact. “The view that state law
retains independent force even after it has been
authoritatively invalidated by this Court” cannot be
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 468.
Id.
230
Id.
231
Id. at 469.
228
229
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accepted in general, and therefore, should not be
accepted in the context of arbitration.232
The California ruling’s interpretation of “law of
your state” treats arbitration contracts differently from
other contracts. They are not placed “on equal footing
with all other contracts.”233 The federal policy
emphatically favoring arbitration is not given its due
and is, in fact, ignored. “The Court of Appeal’s
interpretation is pre-empted by the Federal Arbitration
Act.”234
4. Conclusion
Arbitration in California has been vigorously
opposed by a judicial determination to protect the
integrity of law, the public interest, and legal
civilization itself. Courts exist to implement the
legislative will and protect legal rights. Government
supervision and control inhere in public matters. Even
the Ninth Circuit, a federal court, believed that the
U.S. Supreme Court decisional law on arbitration was
excessive—violative of essential roles and
boundaries. Federalization and preemption deprive
states of regulatory authority within their own
territory on matters that are significant to their
citizens. States become victims of federalism.
California courts have argued that arbitration should
be confined to so-called invisible subject areas like
DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 470.
Id. at 471.
234
Id.
232
233
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commercial contracts and the disruption of mercantile
relationships. It should not intrude upon the
governmental prerogative to regulate and guide
society.
This approach and position are not only
contrarian and unlawful, but they also misrepresent
the capabilities and social value of arbitration. The
California law on arbitration looks backwards; it
harkens to a by-gone era of American society in
which courts played a dominant role and occupied an
unquestioned position of authority in society. During
that time, courts and the law had preemptive
authority. In effect, as noted earlier, the antagonism
between California and federal law on arbitration was
fueled by a regenerated battle for states’ rights in the
American political system.
Most of the California positions and much of its
policy on arbitration are not simply odd and
antiquated, but dangerous as well. They deny the
evident moral and professional failures of adversarial
justice and, concomitantly, of judicial adjudication.
They impede the attenuation or resolution of a
substantial social problem. They state a preference for
a bureaucratic approach to issues that deprecates selfreliance and individual freedom, that deprives society
of the benefit of the energy, thinking, and creativity of
many of its members.
Despite their sophisticated rhetorical and
analytical packaging, California judicial rulings on
arbitration have been (for the most part) the modernday expression of judicial hostility to arbitration. The
SCOTUS has deemed this position unlawful under the
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FAA. Faced with a crisis in law and adjudication, it is
time for courts in California to heed J. William
Fulbright’s battle cry of the 1960s; they should
abandon “old myths” and adjust willingly and well to
“new realities.” Society has evolved beyond its
traditional role and function. The ‘old-time religion’ is
simply too much for society to bear in the domain of
civil litigation. If states can simply defy federal law at
will and have courts rule in opposition to federal
policy, the integrity of national government and
federalism will be shattered.
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